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CRIMINAL LAW
JUVENILE* CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A SPECTACLE
OF A CHILD'S INJUSTICE
June 16, 1944: George Stinney Jr. (14) is executed in South
Carolina's electric chair. He was only 5 '-i" tall and weighed 95
pounds. A local paper reported that the guards had difficulties
strapping him onto the chair and attaching the electrodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Conyers' the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishmen 2 did not bar application
of the death penalty to a defendant who was a juvenile at the time he committed a
capital offense.3 This Note places that ruling in context and analyzes the precedent
on which it is based. Part II will provide the factual background of the case as well
as a historical background ofjuvenile capital punishment in South Carolina and of
United States Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of imposing the
death penalty on juveniles. Part III will analyze the Eighth Amendment's principles
by which the courts have adjudged the validity of the juvenile death penalty. The
Note will demonstrate that the precedent underlying Conyers erroneously relies on
state capital punishment statutes as the sole indicator of society's standard of
decency. The Note will also show that the inherent vulnerability ofjuveniles, which
the law recognizes as an important distinction between minors and adults, renders
the death penalty an excessive form of punishment when applied to children.
Furthermore, the Note will emphasize that the states' failure to protect juveniles by
allowing them to be channeled through an adult criminal system violates their duty
asparenspatriae. Finally, Part IV will conclude that capital punishment, as applied
to Robert Conyers, violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. In a decent, civilized society, a child's fate should be decided
by focusing less on the fluctuating national consensus and more on the
* For the purpose of this article, the terms '"juvenile" and "children" refer to an individual who
has not reached the age of eighteen.
** Abolition Now, Children Sentenced to Death (last modified Mar. 12, 1998)
<http://www.abolition-now.comminors.html>.
1. 326 S.C. 263, 487 S.E.2d 181 (1997).
2. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3. Conyers, 326 S.C. at 266-67, 487 S.E.2d at 183.
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proportionality of the punishment to the blameworthiness of the minor's criminal
actions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. State v. Conyers
The Conyers case arose from an incident that occurred on the night of
November 24, 1991, when Robert Conyers broke into the home of Donna Sue Sims
through a bathroom window.4 Once inside Sims's dwelling, he repeatedly beat her
with a long metal rod, breaking almost every bone in her face and blinding her. The
defendant also sexually assaulted the victim by forcing the metal rod into her
vagina, causing a six-inch tear.' During the attack, the defendant also hit the
victim's children with a blunt object The defendant beat Kimberly, Sims's two-
year-old daughter, to death.' He then went to the bedroom where Sims's five-year-
old son was sleeping and beat him on the head, fracturing the child's skull.9 At the
time of the incident Robert Conyers was sixteen years old.'"
On October 22, 1993, Robert Conyers pled guilty to charges of burglary in the
first degree, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, two counts of assault and
battery with intent to kill, and murder." At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution
introduced testimony about the juvenile's delinquent record. 2 After considering
both the aggravating circumstances 3 presented by the State and the mitigating
circumstances 4 presented by the defense, the trial judge sentenced Robert Conyers
to life for the burglary charge, thirty years for the criminal sexual conduct on Mrs.
Sims, two consecutive twenty-year sentences for the two counts of assault and





9. See Final Brief of Respondent at 6.
10. Conyers, 326 S.C. at 265, 487 S.E.2d at 183.
11. Id. at 264, 487 S.E.2d at 182.
12. Conyers had an extensivejuvenile record. On June 8, 1992, Conyers pled guilty to two counts
of burglary in the first degree, assault and battery with intent to kill, and attempted criminal sexual
conduct. On September 29, 1992, Cqnyers pled guilty to separate counts of criminal sexual conduct in
the first degree, assault and battery with intent to kill, and burglary in the first degree. On February 22,
1993, he pled guilty to murder, criminal sexual conduct, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon.
Conyers was fourteen when he began committing these crimes. Brief of Respondent at 2-4.
13. The State presented three aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder took place while in the
commission of burglary in the first degree, (2) the murder was committed during a criminal sexual
assault, and (3) the murder was committed on a child younger than eleven. Final Brief of Respondent
at 4.
14. Judge M. Duane Shuler considered the age of Robert Conyers at the time of the murder of
Kimberly Sims a mitigating circumstance. Final Brief of Respondent at 4.
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2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 5 [1998], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/8
battery with intentto kill, and to death forthe murder ofKimberly Sims.'" The death
sentence was imposed pursuant to South Carolina's statute permitting juveniles
charged with murder to be tried as adults 6 and authorizing the death penalty for the
offense of murder.' 7
On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, Conyers raised the issue of the
constitutionality of the death penalty as applied tojuveniles.' Conyers relied on the
United States Supreme Court decision of Thompson v. Oklahoma,9 which held that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibited
the execution of offenders younger than sixteen years old at the time they
committed the crime.2" In support of his argument, the defendant also offered the
decision of the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Furman,2' in which the court
reversed a death sentence imposed on a seventeen-year-old on the ground that
Washington's statute was unconstitutional because it allowed minors under the age
of sixteen to be executed for capital crimes.' The Furman court, in turn, had relied
on Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Thompson in which she concluded
that defendants under sixteen years of age "'may not be executed under the
authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at which the
commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execution."'
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Conyers first turned to the issue of
appellate review and concluded that by failing to raise the constitutionality issue of
the juvenile death penalty in the court below, the argument was precluded from
review by the South Carolina Supreme Court.24 Nonetheless, the court, relying on
15. Final Brief of Respondent at 4-5.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-7605(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). This statute mandates that
[w]ithin thirty days after the filing of a petition in the family court alleging the
child has committed the offense of murder or criminal sexual conduct, the person
executing the petition may request in writing that the case be transferred to the
court of general sessions with a view to proceeding against the child as a criminal
rather than as a child coming within the purview of this article.
Id.
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). Section 16-3-20(A) of the code
provides that "[a] person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder must be punished by death, by
imprisonment for life, or by a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years." Id.
18. See Final Brief of Appellant at 7. Appellant argued that "[o]n its face, S.C. Code § 16-3-20
is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. Because the statute does not explicitly set a minimum age
under which capital punishment may not be imposed, it permits the execution of even those below the
age of sixteen, the minimum age set by the United States Supreme Court." Id.
19. 487 U.S. 815 (1988); see Final Brief of Appellant at 8-9.
20. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
21. 858 P.2d 1092 (Wash. 1993); see Final Brief of Appellant at 8.
22. Id. at 1103. The court in Furman reached its holding by reasoning that "if these statutes
authorize imposition of all adult penalties againstjuveniles transferred to adult court, a child as young
as 8 could theoretically be tried as an adult and sentenced to death or life without parole for aggravated
murder." Id. at 1102.
23. Id. at 1102 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
24. State v. Conyers, 326 S.C. 263, 266, 487 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1997).
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Stanford v. Kentucky,25 went on to hold that capital punishment passes
constitutional muster when it is applied to a person who was at least sixteen years
old at the time of the offense.26 Because Conyers was sixteen when he murdered
Kimberly Sims, the court reasoned that the imposition of the death penalty was
constitutionally permissible in his case, and he was thus precluded from raising the
issue.2' Finally, after reviewing the record and the sentence imposed on Conyers,
the court concluded that the death sentence was neither excessive nor
disproportionate to penalties imposed in similar cases.28 Thus, the supreme court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court and Conyers remains on death row awaiting
execution of "justice."
B. Juvenile Capital Punishment in South Carolina
In South Carolina the death penalty has been viewed as a legitimate and
necessary punishment since the arrival of the first colonists.29 Even though the
state's acceptance of this form of punishment does not render South Carolina
different from many other jurisdictions, "there are indications that South Carolina
has been more fervent than other states in imposing and carrying out death
sentences.""0 South Carolina holds the record for legally executing the youngest
person in the history of the United States, George Junius Stinney, Jr., a black child
found guilty for the murder of an eleven-year-old white girl in Clarendon County."'
Stinney was executed on June 16, 1944, at the age of fourteen. 2
Sentencing minors to death did not cease after the Stinney execution. On
January 10, 1986, James Terry Roach was executed in South Carolina's electric
chair33 after having pled guilty "to two counts of murder, criminal sexual conduct,
armed robbery, and kidnapping. ' 4 Roach was under eighteen when he committed
these offenses.3" On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, James Terry Roach, seeking
25. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
26. Conyers, 326 S.C. at 266, 487 S.E.2d at 183.
27. Id. Specifically, the Court stated that "[i]t is well-settled that the constitutionality of a statute
may not be questioned by one whose rights are not invaded and injuriously affected thereby." Id.
28. Id. at 267, 487 S.E.2d 183. Section 16-3-25 of the South Carolina Code mandates that the
Supreme Court of South Carolina review cases involving imposition of the death penalty. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-25(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976). Among the factors to be considered by the court is "[w]hether
the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant." Id. § 16-3-25(C).
29. Bruce L. Pearson, Why the Death Penalty is an Issue, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN SOUTH
CAROLINA 9, 9 (Bruce L. Pearson ed., 1981).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 9-10.
32. Id. This Note's opening quotation describes Stinney's execution.
33. Abolition Now, Children Sentenced to Death (last modified Mar. 12, 1998)
<http://www.abolition-now.com/minors.html>.
34. Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 1467 (4th Cir. 1985).
35. Id. at 1469.
1076 [Vol.49:1073
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federal habeas corpus relief, argued that the South Carolina Supreme Court failed
to satisfy the comparative proportionality review set forth in section 16-3-25(C) of
the South Carolina Code. 6 Roach challenged the South Carolina Supreme Court's
review on the ground that the court was unable to compare defendant's sentence
with similar cases because Roach was the first to be tried under the new death
sentence statute. 7 However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
sentence imposed on Roach for the crimes committed as ajuvenile was appropriate
because the Supreme Court of South Carolina had followed the review mandated
in the statute. 8
In his last appeal to the Supreme Court, Roach requested a writ of certiorari on
"the important question whether an accused may, consistent with the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, be sentenced to death for a capital offense he committed
while a juvenile., 39 At the time Roach was executed, the United States Supreme
Court had yet to establish minimum age requirements for capital punishment.
Furthermore, South Carolina statutes allowed the transfer of ajuvenile accused of
murder or criminal sexual conduct to the general sessions court4° and provided for
the imposition of the death penalty without regard to the offender's age.4' Roach's
petition for awrit of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, and
South Carolina subsequently carried out the execution.42 The issue of the
constitutionality of juvenile capital punishment was not raised again in South
Carolina until Conyers.
C. The United States Supreme Court's Bright-Line Rule43
In the United States, the death penalty was an accepted form of punishment
36. Id. at 1481-82; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(C) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (outlining the
South Carolina Supreme Court's review in death penalty cases).
37. Roach, 757 F.2d at 1482.
38. Id. Additionally, in State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979), the South Carolina
Supreme Court relied on a United States Supreme Court case which established that in order to prevent
the imposition of the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner, a statute had to be drafted
to provide "'for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information
relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information."'
Id. at 202, 255 S.E.2d at 803 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976)). In South Carolina,
the requirements ofabifurcated proceeding were incorporated into the Code. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
3-25(C) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
39. Roach v. Aiken, 474 U.S. 1039, 1039 (1986) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-430 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1996).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
42. Teresa L. Norris, The United States' Violation of International Law 14 (1990) (unpublished
manuscript, available in the University of South Carolina Law Library).
43. As a practical matter, the Court's decisions in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988),
and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), were bright-line rules setting minimum ages for
juvenile capital punishment. However, the rationale behind those rules is more fragile than the term
"bright-line" would tend to suggest.
1998] 1077
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long before the adoption of the Constitution." However, as applied to juveniles, the
death penalty has generated much heated discussion throughout the years. The
controversy has led to closely divided decisions on the subject by the United States
Supreme Court.4" Although the Court did not directly confront the issue until
Thompson v. Oklahoma,46 the Court had earlier expressed concern over the
imposition of juvenile capital punishment.47
In 1988 the Supreme Court held in Thompson that the execution of criminals
younger than sixteen at the time of the offense violates the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.48 William Wayne Thompson was
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for participating in the
shooting of his former brother-in-law, which took place when the defendant was
only fifteen years old.49 In a 4-1-3 split decision, the Court "merely agreed that it
could not agree."5 To determine whether the imposition of the death penalty
violated the Eighth Amendment when a defendant was fifteen at the time the crime
was committed, the Thompson plurality applied the Trop v. Dulles' test, which
relies on "the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society"'52 to provide meaning to ambiguous statutes. The plurality considered the
relevant state statutes, the behavior ofjuries, and the views of various organizations
and countries on the acceptability ofjuvenile capital punishment before concluding
that sentencing a child under the age of sixteen would offend civilized standards of
decency. 3 The plurality noted that such organizations as the American Bar
44. Hanging was a very common form of punishment at the time the Constitution was ratified.
See Norris, supra note 42, at 3 & n.18.
45. See infra notes 50 & 70 and accompanying text.
46. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
47. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Court held that the death penalty did not
violate the Eighth Amendment; however, it recognized that capital punishment cannot be imposed in
an arbitrary or capricious manner. Id. at 195. The Court noted that for capital punishment to pass
constitutional muster, the jury had to evaluate the criminal and the circumstances of the crime prior to
making a sentence recommendation. Id. at 197. The jury was to consider "any special facts about this
defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e.g., his youth, the extent of his
cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time of the crime)." Id. (emphasis added); see
also Lockettv. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (recognizing the importance of thejury's consideration
of mitigating factors when deciding whether to sentence a defendant to death).
In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the Supreme Court overturned the death sentence
imposed on a sixteen-year-old criminal because the trial court failed to consider mitigating
circumstances. Id. at 117. The Court reasoned that "when the defendant was 16 years old at the time
of the offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a harsh
father, and of severe emotional disturbance is particularly relevant." Id. at 115.
48. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
49. Id. at 818-19.
50. Susan M. Simmons, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: Debating the Constitutionality of
Juvenile Executions, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 737, 737 (1989).
51. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
52. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101).
53. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823-38.
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Association and the American Law Institute oppose juvenile capital punishment. 4
In addition to applying the "standard of decency" test, the plurality also
recognized its previous endorsement of the proposition that less culpability is
attributed to a crime committed by ajuvenile than to one carried out by an adult."
As a result, the Court recognized that executing juveniles would not further the
retributive goals of capital punishment. 6 Because juveniles often act out of impulse
and seldom contemplate and evaluate the consequences of their actions, the plurality
also emphasized that the deterrent purpose of the death penalty was not furthered
by the execution ofjuveniles for capital crimes."
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality that
Thompson's death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and should thus be
reversed.58 Furthermore, she perceived the national standard of decency as
prohibiting the imposition of a death sentence on a fifteen-year-old defendant under
a statute that specified no minimum age for the imposition of capital punishment. 9
Justice O'Connor implied that such statutes were unconstitutional by noting "that
petitioner and others who were below the age of 16 at the time of their offense may
not be executed under the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no
minimum age at which the commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's
execution." 60
In Stanford v. Kentucky6' the Supreme Court answered the question that was
left unanswered in Thompson: Does the imposition of capital punishment for a
crime committed at the age of sixteen or seventeen constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment? In Stanford the Court consolidated the
cases of Kevin Stanford, sentenced in Kentucky for rape and murder, and Heath
Wilkins, sentenced in Missouri for stabbing a cashier to death while committing a
robbery.62 The defendants were seventeen and sixteen years old, respectively, at the
time they committed the crimes.63 The majority opinion began its analysis of the
constitutionality ofjuvenile capital punishment by noting that this form of sanction
existed at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted.' The majority agreed with
54. Id. at 830.
55. Id. at 834-35.
56. Id. at 836-37.
57. Id. at 837-38.
58. Id at 848-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
59. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J. concurring in judgment).
60. Id.
61. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
62. Id. at 365-66.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 368. In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), the Court stated that "the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of
punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time thatthe Bill of Rights was adopted."
Id. at 405. The Stanford Court concluded that juvenile capital punishment was not cruel and unusual
punishment at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted because "the common law set the rebuttable
presumption of incapacity to commit any felony at the age of 14, and theoretically permitted capital
1998] 1079
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the Thompson plurality that it should consider objective indications reflecting the
evolving standard of decency in determining whether the sentencing of sixteen and
seventeen year olds violates the Eighth Amendment.5 However, unlike the plurality
in Thompson, the majority disregarded the statements by the various professional
organizations and determined the standards of decency by looking solely to the
conceptions "of modem American society as a whole."66 The Court concluded that
no national consensus classifies the juvenile death penalty as cruel and unusual
punishment.67 The majority also dismissed the reasoning in Thompson that the
reluctance ofjuries to impose the death penalty on individuals yet to reach the age
of eighteen establishes a national consensus against juvenile capital punishment."
Finally, a plurality ofjustices completely disregarded the use of "socioscientific"
evidence such as the juvenile's moral responsibility that had been presented by the
Thompson plurality in support of the idea thatjuvenile capital punishment does not
further the death penalty's retributive and deterrent purposes.6 9
Although Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, she refused to join a
plurality of justices who rejected the application of a proportionality analysis."
Justice O'Connor revised her opinion in Thompson in which she had implied that
a state statute was unconstitutional when it specified no minimum age for the
imposition of the death penalty.7' Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Stanford has
been interpreted as saying that "such specificity [of age in death penalty statutes]
is not required if it is clear that no national consensus prohibits the juvenile death
penalty. 72
With the -holdings of Thompson and Stanford, the Supreme Court established
that it was cruel and unusual punishment if the criminal sentenced to death was
under the age of sixteen at the time of the capital offense. Many states have
followed this bright-line rule set by the United States Supreme Court;7 as a result,
punishment to be imposed on anyone over the age of 7." Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368.
65. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 373.
68. Id. at 374.
69. Id at 378.
70. Id. at 382 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & concurring in judgment).
71. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 857 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring injudgment).
72. T. Shawn Lanier, Note, Juvenile Offenders and the Death Penalty: An Analysis of Stanford
v. Kentucky, 45 MERCERL. REv. 1097, 1105 (1994).
73. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 918 P.2d 1038, 1042-43 (Ariz. 1996) (holding that imposing the
death penalty upon a sixteen-year-old defendant was not cruel and unusual punishment, even though
Arizona's death penalty statute did not specify a minimum age for execution); Allen v. State, 636 So.
2d 494, 497 (Fla. 1994) (overturning a death penalty sentence on a fifteen year old); State v.
Richardson, 923 S.W.2d 301, 329 (Mo. 1996) (holding that sentencing a sixteen-year-old defendant
to death was not cruel and unusual punishment); Wright v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 379,383 (Va.
1993) (concluding that imposing the death penalty on a seventeen-year-old defendant did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment because it did not violate society's evolving standards of decency); cf
State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092 (Wash. 1993) (relying on Thompson in holding that Washington's
death penalty statute could not be construed to authorize imposition of the death penalty for a crime
[Voi.49:10731080
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the number of criminals on death row awaiting punishment for crimes committed
under the age of eighteen is steadily increasing.74 In Conyers the Supreme Court of
South Carolina, like other states, adopted the reasoning in Stanford and held that
sentencing a sixteen-year-old juvenile offender did not violate the Eighth
Amendment."
III. ANALYSIS
The constantly changing interpretation of legislation governing juvenile capital
punishment cannot be dispositive of society's standards of decency. Because of the
uncertainty embedded in the way officials calculate modem decency standards, state
perspectives on the death penalty as applied to minors cannot alone be indicative
of a national consensus. Furthermore, the inherent difference in blameworthiness
between adults and juveniles makes capital punishment an excessive form of
punishment when applied to minors. Yet, the majority in Stanford refused to take
into account the latter factor and considered only the states' statutes in determining
what constitutes society's standard of decency.
A. Juvenile CapitalPunishment andSociety'sEvolvingStandards ofDecency
Even though a state has the power to punish its citizens for wrongs committed,
the punishment inflicted must pass constitutional muster. While the Eighth
Amendment provides that cruel and unusual punishment cannot be imposed,76 the
constitutional clause "is not susceptible of precise definition."77 In Trop v. Dulles"
the Court attempted to set a standard of what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment by holding that "[tihe [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."79
While Trop provides a guide for courts to follow in establishing a constitutional
committed by a juvenile because it specified no minimum age at which the death penalty could be
applied).
74. At the close of 1983, 33 individuals were on death rows for crimes committed as juveniles.
By August 18, 1997, 58 juvenile offenders were waiting to be put to death. Victor L. Streib, Current
Death Row Inmates Under Juvenile Death Sentences (visited Jan. 21, 1998)
<http://prince.essential.org/dpic/juvchar.html>.
75. State v. Conyers, 326 S.C. 263,266,487 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1997).
76. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
77. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,258 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). The Supreme Court
has expressed the difficulties in defining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in several
cases. In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879), the Court stated that "[d]ifficulty would attend the
effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and
unusual punishments shall not be inflicted." Id. at 135-36. Subsequently, in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86 (1958), the Court once again observed that"t]he exactscope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and
unusual' has not been detailed by this Court." Id. at 99.
78. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
79. Id. at 101.
1998] 1081
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minimum, it failed to specifically set forth how to determine the modem standards
of decency. Thus, the application of the test was left open to different
interpretations.
Courts have considered various indicators that reflect contemporary societal
values in determining the constitutionality of a form of punishment. Among these
are legislative response, sentencing recommendations by juries, and international
opinion.80 While the United States Supreme Court has considered all three attributes
when deciding on the constitutionality of the death penalty in various cases,8' the
Stanford majority, on which the South Carolina Supreme Court relied in Conyers,
refrained from considering the opinions of organizations and other countries on the
decency of juvenile capital punishment.82 Rather, the majority in Stanford relied
solely on legislative judgments as the basis of society's general acceptance of
imposing the death penalty on juveniles. 3
Relying on "statutes passed by society's elected representatives,"" the Court
concluded thatthe national consensus favors allowing juvenile capital punishment.85
However, the Stanford approach presents two major problems. First, the analysis
errs by relying exclusively on state death penalty statutes to measure society's
standard of decency. Second, by ignoring other countries' and entities' views on
juvenile capital punishment the Court did not get a complete view of the modem
standard of decency.
1. Inadequacy ofDetermining the Standard of Decency by Sole
Reliance on Legislative Attitudes
When considering whether imposing the death penalty on juveniles is in
harmony with modem standards of decency, reliance on states' death penalty
80. See Lawrence A. Vanore, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors: Contemporary
Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 768 (1986).
81. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 384 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The views
oforganizations with expertise in relevant fields and the choices ofgovernments elsewhere in the world
also merit our attention as indicators whether a punishment is acceptable in a civilized society.");
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) ("The conclusion that it would offend civilized
standards ofdecency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time ofhis orher offense
is consistent with the views that have been expressed by ... other nations that share our Anglo-
American heritage...."); Enmundv. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,801 (1982) (holding that the death penalty
as imposed on defendant was precluded by the Eighth Amendment because only eight jurisdictions in
the nation authorized imposition of capital punishment in such a case); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
179, 181 (1976) (noting that "[tihe most marked indication of society's endorsement of the death
penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman" but also noting that "[t]he jury also is a
significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved").
82. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.1 ("We emphasize that it isAmerican conceptions of decency that
are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici... that the sentencing
practices of other countries are relevant.").
83. Id. at 370-71.
84. Id. at 370.
85. Id. at 380.
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statutes can lead to error. The split decisions in Thompson and Stanford emphasized
that calculating whether the majority of states allow juveniles below the age of
eighteen to be sentenced to death can lead to subjective and inconsistent results that
do not necessarily reflect reality. At the time Thompson was decided, fourteen states
did not authorize capital punishment regardless of the criminal's age, and nineteen
states authorized it but stated no minimum age requirements.86 However, the
eighteen states that included a minimum age in their capital punishment statutes
mandated that the offender be at least sixteen years old when the offense was
committed.87 Looking at those figures, the Thompson plurality concluded that
imposing the death sentence on a juvenile under sixteen was against the national
consensus.
88
Of the thirty-seven states that permitted capital punishment at the time Stanford
was decided, fifteen of them precluded it for offenders younger than seventeen, and
twelve declined to impose the punishment on offenders younger than eighteen.89 In
reaching this conclusion, the majority failed to take into consideration the fifteen
states in which capital punishment was not authorized at all.9" Instead, the plurality
focused on the ratio of the number of states permitting the imposition of capital
punishment to the number of states setting different age minimums.9 The dissenting
Justices in Stanford reached the opposite conclusion by considering the states that
prohibited the death penalty.92 From the discrepancies of those decisions, it becomes
86. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826-27. At the time Thompson was decided, the following thirteen
states, as well as the District of Columbia, did not authorize capital punishment: Alaska, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 826-28 n.25. Furthermore, of the thirty-
seven states allowing imposition of the death penalty, the following nineteen set no minimum age
requirement in their statutes: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at 828 n.26.
87. Id. at 829.
88. In reaching its conclusion, the plurality relied on the thirty-two states that either did not allow
juvenile capital punishment or allowed the punishment only for individuals that were at least sixteen
years of age. Id.
89. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989).
90. By the time Stanfordwas decided, Vermont, which had previously allowed the death penalty
and set no minimum age for its imposition, had rejected the punishment altogether. Id. at 384 n.1
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 370-74.
92. Id. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices reasoned that when thel2 states
with statutes setting a minimum age at which an individual could be sentenced to death were added to
the 15 states that did not permit the imposition of the death penalty, a total of 27 states had concluded
that an individual under the age of eighteen should not be sentenced to die. Id. Moreover, the dissenting
Justices noted that "[a] further three States explicitly refuse to authorize sentences of death for those
who committed their offense when under 17, making a total of 30 states that would not tolerate the
execution of petitioner Wilkins." Id. (citation omitted).
The dissent's calculation was criticized by the majority as follows: "The dissent again works its
statistical magic by refusing to count among the States that authorize capital punishment of 16- and 17-
year-old offenders those 19 States that set no minimum age in their death penalty statute, and
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evident that the issue of national consensus depends on the numbers applied to the
ratios. Both the majority and the dissent in Stanford applied the calculation that
validated their decision. However, by doing so, they unknowingly illustrated the
difficulties in establishing modem standards of decency, particularly when the Court
solely relies on legislative judgments to determine what constitutes "decency."' '93
When the justices solely rely on legislative judgments to analyze the
constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on juveniles, the resulting standard
is uncertain. As one commentator concluded, "Apparently, such punishment will
always pass Eighth Amendment analysis if the powerful political blocs in a slight
majority of the states can persuade the legislature to enact juvenile death penalty
statutes."'94 Since the Stanford decision, several state statutes have changed. Today,
twelve states and the District of Columbia prohibit the death penalty completely,'
thirteen states and Congress prohibit the imposition of capital punishment on
offenders younger than eighteen,96 three states have set the age minimum for capital
punishment at seventeen,97 fifteen states have set no minimum age,98 and the
specifically permit 16- and 17-year-olds to be sentenced as adults." Id. at 371 n.3.
93. The regional disparities in legislative judgments further reflect a lack of national consensus
on the issue of the juvenile death penalty. In Thompson "not one Justice recognized that the states that
still permitjuvenile executions are generally concentrated in two large regions ofthe country, the South
and the West." Dominic J. Ricotta, Eighth Amendment-The Death Penal, for Juveniles: A State's
Right or a Child's Injustice?, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 921,942 (1988). The southern states that
may allow the imposition of death sentences on persons younger than 17 are Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia. See infranotes 96-99. North
Carolina, Georgia, and Texas have set the minimum age for capital punishment at 17. See infra note
97. In the West, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming may allow
individuals as young as 16 years of age to be executed. See infra notes 98-99. Such a regional
concentration in favor of juvenile capital punishment is more evidence of the lack of a national
consensus.
94. Lanier, supra note 72, at 1107-08.
95. Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Tracy L. Snell, U.S. Department
ofJustice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (visited Jan. 11, 1998)
<http:/lwww.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/asciilcp96.txt>.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (West Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-11-802 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a- 46a(g)(1) (West Supp. 1998); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4622 (1995); MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957
art.27, § 412(f) (1997);NEE. REv. STAT § 28-105.01 (1995);N.J. STAT.ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(g) (West Supp.
1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14A (Michie 1994); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27 (McKinney 1998);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.02 (Anderson 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 161.620 (1990); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(1) (1997).
97. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-9-3 (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1997); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 8.07 (West Supp. 1998).
98. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (Michie
1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1998); IDAHO
CODE § 19-2515 (1997); Miss. CODEANN. § 43-21-157 (Supp. 1997) (requiring a defendant to be 13
years old before allowing transfer ofjuvenile cases to criminal court); MONT. CODEANN. §§ 46-18-301
to -310 (1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:5VI(d) (1996); OKLA. STAT.ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (Vest
1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997); S.C. CODEANN. § 16-3-20 (Law.
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remaining seven states have set the minimum age at sixteen.99
If the Court were to follow the approach employed by the dissent in Stanford,
a national consensus in favor of executing juveniles would not be reached. Indeed,
the majority of states, when taking into account those that have banned capital
punishment completely, prohibit the death penalty for offenders younger than
seventeen years of age.' However, following the Court's approach, the changes
that the death penalty statutes have undergone since Stanford reflect a slightly
different national consensus. At the time Stanfordwas decided, approximately forty
states precluded capital punishment on offenders younger than seventeen,'0 ' but
only approximately a third of the states declined to impose it on seventeen-year-old
defendants. 2 Today, out of the thirty-eight states that permit the death penalty,
sixteen states and Congress have enacted statutes that prohibit the imposition of a
death sentence on any offender under the age of seventeen. 3 Thus, almost half the
states that permit death sentences would view the sentencing of Robert Conyers as
impermissible. Even though this number does not establish the national consensus
the Stanford court requires, it is clear that the national consensus standard has
become "a battle of the interpretation of legislation and statistics.''"" In short, only
a couple more state legislatures would have to enact legislation so that a national
consensus of states would then prohibit the sentence of Robert Conyers. The
approach endorsed by a plurality of justices in Stanford results in too much
uncertainty because it is strictly limited to the changing views of the state
legislatures and overlooks the important views of other countries and legal entities.
Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 23A-27A-1 (Michie 1988); UTAH CODEANN. § 76-3-207
(Supp. 1997);VA. CODEANm. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995); WASH.Rav. CODEANN. § 10.95.080 (West.
1990).
99. ALA. CODE § 12-15-34.1 (Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-3(b) (Michie 1998); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 640.040 (Michie Supp. 1996); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 305 (West Supp.
1997); LA. CODE CPM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West 1997); MO. CODEANN. § 565.020 (West Supp.
1998; NEv.REv. STAT. ANN. § 176.025 (Michie 1997); WYO. STAT.ANN. § 6-2-101(b) (Michie 1997);
see also State v. Stone, 535 So. 2d 362 (La. 1988) (finding that the statutory scheme, which allowed
defendants under the age of 16 to be tried as adults, did not evidence a deliberate attempt to allow death
sentence for those under 16 years old).
100. A total of 16 states do not permit capital punishment of 16 year olds. See supra notes 96-97
and accompanying text. If that figure is added to the 12 states and the District of Columbia that prohibit
the death penalty, it becomes evident that almost 55% of the states would not allow offenders like
Robert Conyers to be executed.
101. Out of the 37 states that permitted the imposition of the death penalty, 15 of them declined
to impose it on 16 year olds. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989).
102. See id.
103. See supra notes 96-97.
104. Ricotta, supra note 93, at 941.
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2. Modern Standard of Decency Should Be Based on Universal
Conceptions of What Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In concluding that the attitudes of the states toward the juvenile death penalty
did not establish a sufficient degree of national consensus to label the practice cruel
and unusual, the South Carolina Supreme Court followed the plurality's analysis in
Stanford that overlooked the opinions of other countries and professional entities
in the United States.
a. International Opinion
The Stanford decision breaks with precedent by ignoring international opinion
and strongly undermines the conclusion that the plurality reached in Thompson. In
Enmund v. Florida05 the Court relied on Coker v. Georgia"° in accepting
international opinion as a relevant factor when determining the constitutionality of
the death penalty. 7 Looking at its previous decision in Coker, the Court noted that
its "judgment 'should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible
extent.' Accordingly, the Court looked to the historical development of the
punishment at issue, legislative judgments, international opinion, and the
sentencing decisions juries have made before bringing its own judgment to bear on
the matter."" 8 In Thompson the plurality similarly established the importance of
international opinion in the context ofjuvenile capital punishment. 9 The plurality
emphasized that of the countries still permitting the imposition of capital
punishment, most do not allow it to be imposed on juveniles; even for adults, these
countries seldom permit capital punishment."'
The vast international concern about the subject is reflected in the latest
adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child on November
20, 1989. "' The convention provided that the imposition of capital punishment and
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole should not be allowed for
105. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
106. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
107. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788.
108. Id. at 788-89 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The
Court emphasized the importance of other countries' opinions by noting that "'[t]he climate of
international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment' is an additional
consideration which is 'not irrelevant."' Id. at 796 n.22 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10). Thus,
the Court decided that it was worth considering that the felony murder doctrine had been abolished in
several countries and restricted in others. Id.
109. The plurality noted that the death penalty had been abolished entirely in Australia, West
Germany, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, and in all Scandinavian countries. Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988).
110. Id.
111. Cel6 Hancock, The Incompatibility of the Juvenile Death Penalty and the United Nation's
Convention on the Rights of the Child: Domestic and International Concerns, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 699, 699 (1995).
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offenders under eighteen years of age. 1 ' Even though almost every country ratified
the convention, the United States refused and decided to "retain the flexibility and
authority to impose sentences in accordance with the tenets of its citizens and
elected officials.""..3 The 1989 United Nations Convention was not the first source
of international law on the issue of juvenile capital punishment. In 1976 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" 4 (ICCPR) became binding on
the nations that ratified it." 5 The covenant contained "a prohibition against the
execution of persons who committed crimes below the age of eighteen."
'" 6
Although the United States signed the Covenant in 1977, it refused to ratify the
Covenant; as a result, "the United States is not bound to enforce the provisions of
the treaty domestically.""1
7
Currently, most nations have completely outlawed capital punishment for
ordinary crimes, and the countries that continue to impose the death penalty do not
execute juveniles." 8 "As of 1989, thirty-four countries [had] abolished the death
penalty for all crimes,""' 9 eighty-four limit the punishment to individuals over the
age of eighteen by their own laws or by their ratification of the ICCPR, 20 and nine
retain capital punishment in their statutes but have abolished it in practice. 2' If
international conceptions were included in determining what constitutes decency,
it becomes evident that juvenile capital punishment is not an accepted practice for
punishing offenders.
In Trop v. Dulles" the Supreme Court defined cruel and unusual punishment
as one that is contrary to the "standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."'" However, the Court did not limit the definition of "society" to
American society.24 A plurality of justices in Stanford, faced with the liberty to
define the boundaries of society, overlooked previous interpretations that
112. Id.
113. Id. at 700.
114. This covenant, along with other international covenants on Economics and Social and
Cultural Rights, constitute the International Bill of Human Rights. The articles of the ICCPR were
intended to address fundamental human rights such as the right to be free from torture and slavery.
David Heffernan, Comment, America the Cruel and Unusual? An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment
Under International Law, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 481,482 n.4 (1995).
115. Norris, supra note 42, at 11.
116. Id. at 12.
117. Id. at 11.
118. Id. at 9-10.
119. Kha Q. Nguyen, Note, In Defense of the Child: A Jus Cogens Approach to the Capital
Punishment ofJuveniles in the UnitedStates, 28 GEO. WASH.J.INT'LL. &EcoN.401, 423 (1995). For
a list of these countries, see id. at 423 n.145.
120. Id. at 423-24. For a listing of these 84 countries, see id. at 423-24 n.146.
121. Id. at 424. For the countries that, as of 1989, had not executed anyone in the previous ten
or more years, see id. at 424 n.148.
122. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
123. Id. at 101.
124. Id. at 102.
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encompassed international opinions.'25 However, because juvenile capital
punishment and the death penalty in general are issues that concern every country
in the world, international opinion should be considered when analyzing what
constitutes decency in today's society. Furthermore, because of the uncertainty
created when only state legislative judgment is considered in determining whether
juvenile capital punishment meets the modem standard of decency test, international
opinion should be consulted by the courts. Considering the views of other countries
would certainly indicate that the juvenile death penalty is not an accepted form of
punishment in civilized nations.
b. Domestic Professional Organizations
The standards of decency of today's society are also reflected in the views of
professional organizations. The plurality in Thompson apparently afforded these
opinions great weight.'26 For example, the plurality took note that the American Bar
Association and the American Law Institute have both "formally expressed their
opposition to the death penalty for juveniles."'27 The American Law Institute has
stated that
there is at least one class of murder for which the death sentence should
never be imposed. This situation is murder by juveniles. The Institute
believes that civilized societies will not tolerate the spectacle of execution
of children, and this opinion is confirmed by the American experience in
punishing youthful offenders.... The Institute debated a motion to lower
the age of exclusion to 14 but rejected that proposition on the ground that,
however dangerous some children may be, the death penalty should be
reserved for mature adults.
28
While the plurality in Thompson greatly relied on both the practices of other
countries and the views of professional organizations, the Stanford majority
disregarded these views when deciding the constitutionality of the juvenile death
penalty for offenders over sixteen years old. By following the Stanfordplurality and
refusing to consider the views of organizations and other countries, the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Conyers was "unable to accurately gauge 'evolving
standards of decency.'" 29 Because societal norms of decency are constantly
changing, courts should look beyond merely counting the shifting number of states
in favor of executing juveniles when determining a national consensus. Divining a
societal standard of decency is difficult enough without disregarding the opinions
125. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368-80 (1989).
126. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988).
127. Id.
128. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 commentary at 133 (1980).
129. Lanier, supra note 72, at 1107 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
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of professional organizations and the international community.
B. Proportionality Test as Applied to Juvenile Capital Punishment
Although the judgments of legislatures have always been taken into account
when courts consider the constitutionality ofjuvenile capital punishment, 'it is for
[the Court] ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition
of the death penalty.""..30 When deciding the constitutionality of the death penalty
as a form of punishment, the Court in Gregg v. Georgia.. concluded that "public
perceptions of standards of decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not
conclusive."'3 Instead, the Court required that the penalty had to be in accord with
"'the dignity of man,""33 which meant that the punishment could not be excessively
unproportional to the severity of the crime committed. In Thompson the plurality
retained the proportionality test and emphasized that
[i]n making that judgment, we first ask whether the juvenile's culpability
should be measured by the same standard as that of an adult, and then
consider whether the application of the death penalty to this class of
offenders 'measurably contributes' to the social purposes that are served
by the death penalty.'
Because of the problems embedded in solely relying on the standard of decency test,
the proportionality test should be employed by courts to weigh the harshness of the
penalty against the culpability of the offender. By failing to apply this test, the
Stanford plurality placed too much emphasis on offenders' adult-like acts and
overlooked both the lack of contribution that the sentencing has on the retributive
and deterrent goals of the death penalty'35 and the protection that those juvenile
offenders are owed by the judicial system. Courts have wrongly assumed that
juveniles, like Robert Conyers, have undergone a premature "rite of passage" and
become adults simply because they committed an "adult" crime.
130. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982)).
131. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
132. Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
133. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
134. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833.
135. The death penalty serves "two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence." Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). The retributive purpose of capital punishment is tailored to the
idea that society needs to express its outrage toward the offender and vindicate the wrongs committed
by sentencing the offender to die. Id. The deterrent value of the death penalty, on the other hand, "'is
part of the nature of man' in that it is the instinct embedded in each individual that guides us to
promote 'the stability of a society governed by law."' Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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1. Culpability of Juveniles
Even though juveniles may commit otherwise capital offenses, they deserve less
punishment because juveniles do not have the same degree of culpability as adult
offenders. Until the Stanford decision, the Court had recognized this reality. In
Eddings v. Oklahoma,'36 for example, the Court remarked that "[o]ur history is
replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier
years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults.""'3 However, aplurality
of justices in Stanford rejected the proportionality test and refused to consider
whether juvenile capital punishment furthered the goals of the death penalty
because it held that "[t]he battle must be fought.., on the field of the Eighth
Amendment; and in that struggle socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely
scientific evidence is not an available weapon.""'3 The plurality justified its rejection
of the proportionality test by noting that employing the test is tantamount to
replacing "judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings."' 3 9 However,
by making such an argument, the plurality overlooked at least one important factor
that would lead the court to conclude juvenile offenders should not be held to the
same level of responsibility for their crimes as adults. Juvenile crime is not
exclusively the offender's fault. Studies of homicidal adolescents have shown that
these juveniles are the product of the unstable and violent environment in which
they are raised.'40 To sentence them to death means punishing them for the
collective wrongs of society.
Although a plurality ofjustices inStanfordrecognized that some individualized
consideration is necessary for juvenile capital punishment to meet constitutional
muster, they refused to employ the proportionality test.'4' Instead, the plurality
concluded that the criminal justice system provides such individualized testing
when age is considered as a mitigating factor during the sentencing phase.'
42
However, consideration of youthfulness during the sentencing phase is insufficient
to protect juveniles from the unconstitutional imposition of the death penalty.
Indeed, the jury may not even consider the defendant's age particularly important.
First, the juvenile may have reached the age of majority by the time of trial.
Furthermore, the jury might mistakenly conclude that because the defendant is in
an adult court rather than a juvenile court, the judge has already taken youth into
consideration. The plurality in Stanford was aware of the importance of
136. 455 U.S.U104 (1982).
137. Id. at 115-16; see also Maria M. Homan, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Counsel's Role in
the Development ofa Mitigation Defense, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 767,782 (1987) ("A minor is simply less
responsible than an adult and therefore a punishment imposed on a juvenile must recognize this
diminished responsibility.").
138. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989).
139. Id. at 379.
140. Homan, supra note 137, at 769.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 5 [1998], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/8
CRIMINAL LAW1
individualized consideration when applying the death penalty, and yet it disregarded
the proportionality test previously adopted by the plurality in Thompson. If the
proportionality test had been applied in Stanford, the death penalty forjuveniles like
Robert Conyers would be deemed disproportionate because minors are generally
less culpable for their crimes than adults.
2. Juveniles and the Retributive and Deterrent Goals of Capital
Punishment
Juvenile capital punishment lacks the penological justification embedded in the
death penalty. The death penalty is carried out for the purpose of retribution and
deterrence; 43 however, those purposes are not furthered when capital punishment
is imposed on minors. Even though retribution is a constitutionally permissible
purpose for the imposition of the death penalty,'" this justification is less palatable
when directed toward a child.'45 Retribution serves the purpose of restoring
"'balance on an imaginary tote board of social rights and wrongs."' ' 46 Because
society is in part to blame for the wrongs committed by juveniles, sentencing those
minors to death "does less to redress the social imbalance created by their
crimes."'47 The retributive justification for capital punishment thus lacks appeal
when a child is the subject of the ultimate punishment.'48
The death penalty's goal of general deterrence relies on the notion that
executions of criminal offenders will deter other potential offenders from
committing similar crimes. Deterrence has been the subject of debate because its
impact remains unverified.'49 Capital punishment serves as a deterrent only when
wrongful acts are the result of "'premeditation and deliberation.". 0 In other words,
for the death penalty to be an effective deterrent, potential offenders must
understand the threat of being executed and change their actions accordingly.
However, children's inexperience and lack of education make them less able to
evaluate the consequences of their conduct.' Juveniles usually "live for the
moment" and thus have less inclination to consider long-term consequences.'52
143. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
144. Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience With Capital
Punishmentfor Crimes Committed While UnderAge Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. Rev. 613, 637 (1983).
145. Id.
146. Vanore, supra note 80, at 787 (quoting Joseph W. Little, The Law ofSentencing as Public
Ceremony, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1983)).
147. Id.
148. Victor L. Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment of Juveniles, 34 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 363, 392 (1986).
149. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185 (1976); see also Streib, supra note 148, at 392-93.
150. Vanore, supra note 80, at 788 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463,484 (1946)).
151. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988) ("The likelihood that the teenage
offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of
execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.").
152. Homan, supra note 137, at 780.
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Moreover, because mostjuveniles consider death aremote possibility, they are more
willing than adults to engage in "death defying behavior."'53 Furthermore, rates of
recidivism among juvenile murderers are comparatively low,'54 and evidence has
shown that juveniles can be rehabilitated and that their propensity for crime
decreases as they grow older. 5
Not only is the execution of minors an ineffective deterrent for potential
juvenile offenders, it may also not be effective in deterring adult offenders.
5 6
Because the deterrent effect is likely to influence only those individuals who can
identify with the person being executed,'" adults may not be deterred unless they
can identify with the juvenile offender. In short, because juvenile capital
punishment makes no significant contribution to the two goals of the death penalty,
long-term imprisonment would be a sufficient punishment for such young criminals.
C. Juvenile Offenders in an Adult Judicial System
The Supreme Court has recognized that "juvenile offenders constitutionally
may be treated different from adults."'" Such different treatment manifests itself
through limitations on a minor's right to vote, contract, purchase alcoholic
beverages, dispose of property by will, and drive a vehicle.'59 The distinctive
treatment ofjuveniles is perhaps most evident in the separatejuvenile justice system
that emerged at the beginning of this century. 6 These laws reflect a judgment that
juveniles need the protection of states, not their punishment. In In re Gault6" the
Court noted that the juvenile justice system emerged as a result of the harshness
present in the correctional facilities of the adult criminal justice system.'62 The
Court emphasized that the idea of crime and punishment was to be absent from the
juvenile justice system, and the child "was to be made 'to feel that he is the object
of [the state's] care and solicitude.""' Juvenile courts were established to treat
153. Vanore, supra note 80, at 789.
154. Streib, supra note 148, at 395.
155. Id. (".lincorrigibility is inconsistent with youth; that it is impossible to make ajudgment
that a fourteen-year-old youth, no matter how bad, will remain incorrigible for the rest of his life."'
(alteration in original) (quoting Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (1968))).
156. Vanore, supra note 80, at 788.
157. Id.
158. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
159. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988). The plurality in Thompson
emphasized the importance of "recognizing that there are differences which must be accommodated
in determining the rights and duties of children as compared with those of adults." Id. (quoting Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590-91 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
160. See Streib, supra note 144, at 616. In 1899 Illinois led the movement toward separate
juvenile justice systems. By 1925 almost all the states had enacted legislation that modified the criminal
system for juveniles. Id.
161. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
162. Id. at 15.
163. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV.
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child offenders differently from adult offenders by "provid[ing] measures of
guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix
criminal responsibility."'"
Due to the recognized immaturity and vulnerability of juveniles, states have
assumed parental responsibilities inmany areas ofjuvenile law and have recognized
their duty asparenspatriae toward minors. 6 However, in response to an increase
in juvenile crimes, state legislatures have enacted laws that allow juveniles to be
tried and sentenced as adults.'"Now the most serious juvenile offenders are treated
as adults because of the crimes that they are alleged to have committed. By
providing a separate justice system for juvenile offenders, states have expressed
their concern for minors and yet "seek to exclude those who most challenge the
system's rehabilitative and beneficial aspects."' 67 As one commentator noted, "Ifthe
juvenile court will not handle the most serious offenses and offenders, it is difficult
to see what is advantageous about a separate juvenile justice system."'65 Judges are
supposed to act as protectors toward juveniles under the doctrine ofparenspatriae;
however, by sentencing Robert Conyers to death under South Carolina's statute
allowing juveniles to be sentenced as adults, the trial judge acted more like an
104, 120(1909)).
164. Patton v. Toy, 867 F. Supp. 356,363 (D.S.C. 1994) (emphasis added) (citing Kentv. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 552 (1966)).
165. See Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests of the Child?,
26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 147,160 (1995). The termparenspatriae "refers to a state's traditional role as the
guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles, under which it acts to promote their
welfare." Id. at 149 n.23.
In South Carolina the state's duty asparenspatriae has been embedded in the Children's Code.
See S.C. CODEANN. §§ 20-7-10 to 20-7-9575 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1997). The South Carolina
Children's Code establishes that "[ilt shall be the policy of this State to concentrate on the prevention
of children's problems as the most important strategy which can be planned and implemented on behalf
of children and their families." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 1976). Furthermore, the
Code emphasizes the state's duty to protect juvenile delinquents by noting that the policy "shall apply
to all children who have need of services including... those who by their circumstance or action
violate the laws of this State and are found to be in need of treatment or rehabilitation." Id. § 20-7-
20(A).
166. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-7605 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). A juvenile may be
subjected to the jurisdiction of criminal courts in two ways: through judicial waivers or legislative
waivers. Under a legislative waiver, the minor may be prosecuted directly in the criminal court based
on the seriousness of the crimes committed. Vanore, supra note 80, at 758 n.5. Under ajudicial waiver,
the juvenile court may decide to transfer the case to a criminal court after determining that the juvenile
cannot be treated in ajuvenile system because the child poses a threat to either the public safety or to
other juvenile offenders. Id.
In South Carolina only judicial waiver is allowed. Indeed, the family courtjudge has the discretion
to decide whether the case should be transferred to the court of general sessions to proceed against the
juvenile as an adult instead of a minor. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-7605(4) to (5) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1997).
167. Katherine Hunt Federle, Emancipation and Execution: Transferring Children to Criminal
Court in Capital Cases, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 447,448 (1996).
168. Id. at 487.
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executioner. 69
IV. CONCLUSION
In State v. Conyers the South Carolina Supreme Court held that it was not
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to execute ajuvenile. This Note has
examined several flaws with that holding. Both the South Carolina Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court should have taken into account many factors
such as international opinion and the views of respected organizations when
determining society's standards of decency. The United States may be the only
civilized country that still imposes juvenile capital punishment. In a nation that is
economically, militarily, technologically, and culturally a superpower, it is indecent
that we still allow such an unjust, cruel and unusual punishment to be inflicted on
our children. Despite the seriousness of the crimes committed by juveniles such as
Robert Conyers, capital punishment is not the answer. The execution ofjuveniles
probably does not further the twin purposes of capital punishment-deterrence and
retribution. Moreover, an inherent conflict exists between the state's dual roles as
parenspatriae and asjuvenile executioner. In Conyers the South Carolina Supreme
Court decided that the state could play both roles. When, and if, Robert Conyers
goes to the electric chair, it will not be the execution of justice-it will be a
spectacle of a child's injustice.
Elisabeth Gasparini
169. See Strater, supra note 165, at 170 ("It is this contradiction, a state on the one hand
protecting the child, and on the other hand sentencing a child to death, that makes the juvenile death
penalty inconsistent with a state's duty toward children.").
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GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL: A POOR PROGNOSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Though surrounded by controversy,' defendants in South Carolina continue to
be found guilty but mentally ill (GBMI).2 Over the past six years, approximately
161 persons have been convicted and sentenced under South Carolina's GBMI
statute? One of these statistics is Brent Hornsby. In State v. Hornsby4 the South
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the GBMI verdict on due
process grounds.5 Despite this decision and similar decisions across the country,6
GBMI statutes continue to raise serious due process and equal protection concerns.7
With the adoption of GBMI statutes, legislatures appear to be codifying their
collective lack of confidence in a jury's willingness or ability to abide by the
statutory definition of insanity and acquit only those who are legally insane.
After briefly summarizing the Hornsby case and other relevant South Carolina
case law in Part II, this Note analyzes the different constitutional issues raised by
the Hornsby decision. Part III specifically discusses how this verdict interacts with,
and in some cases infringes upon, a defendant's due process, equal protection, and
Eighth Amendment rights. Additionally, Part III considers South Carolina's
treatment of each of these issues, referencing similar laws and decisions of other
states for comparison, as well as discussing less questionable alternatives.
1. Guilty but mentally ill statutes have caught the attention of the public and practioners alike.
In a recent editorial, the GMBI verdict was castigating as "serv[ing] neither justice nor compassion."
Editorial, State ShouldReview Verdict of Guilty but Mentally ll, THEHERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Sept.
28, 1997, at 2E.
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
3. As of January 1998, South Carolina Department of Corrections records indicate that the
following numbers of inmates were convicted in South Carolina under the GBMI statute: in 1992-24
persons; 1993-26 persons; 1994-22 persons; 1995-31 persons; 1996-27; persons; and 1997-31
persons. Telephone Interview with Carolyn Hudson, Offender Information Management Branch,
Division of Resource and Information Management, South Carolina Department of Corrections (Jan.
12, 1998). If an inmate was convicted under the GBMI statute in both 1992 and 1994, the inmate is
only counted once. Id.
4. 326 S.C. 121, 484 S.E.2d 869 (1997).
5. Id. at 130, 484 S.E.2d at 874.
6. See, e.g., State v. Neely, 819 P.2d 249 (N.M. 1991) ("We conclude that the legislature pursued
legitimate goals in enacting the statute allowing the guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict and that the statute
is reasonably designed to achieve that goal.").
7. See People v. Robles, 682 N.E.2d 194,205 (App. Ct. 1997), cert. granted, 686 N.E.2d 1170
(Iil. Oct. 1, 1997) ("[Tjhe GBMI statute encourages compromise verdicts and... as a result, the
subject statutory scheme deprives a defendant of due process.").
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II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. The Law
South Carolina enacted its GBMI statute in 1984.8 The statute provides:
A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if, at the time of the
commission of the act constituting the offense, he had the capacity
to distinguish right from wrong or to recognize his act as being
wrong as defined in Section 17-24-10(A), but because of mental
disease or defect he lacked sufficient capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law.9
The GBMI statute embodies a form of "irresistible impulse" test,' or an inability
to behave within the confines of the law, which some states incorporate into their
definition of insanity." South Carolina defines insanity using the English
8. Act of May 16, 1984, No. 396, § 2, 1984 S.C. Acts 1785, 1786 (codified as amended at S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997)). When South Carolina enacted the GBMI statute,
many states and the federal government were abolishing such volition tests in the wake of the
controversy surrounding the insanity acquittal of John Hinkley, Jr., the would-be assassin of President
Reagan. See, e.g., Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(98 Stat.) 3182, 3407 (detailing the elimination of the volitional prong from the federal insanity test);
UTAH CODEANN. § 76-2-305 (1995) (repealing former law thatprovided both cognitive and volitional
prongs for insanity test and providing current law allowing mental illness or insanity to be used only
when attacking the "mental state" element of the charged offense); Randy G. LaGrone & Don C.
Combs, Alternatives to the Insanity Defense, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 93 (1984) (discussing the
controversy surrounding the insanity defense and the need for a better method). Although the South
Carolina GBMI statute embodies the irresistible impulse test, see infra notes 10-11 and accompanying
text, the statute does not enlarge the definition of insanity beyond the cognitive, knowing right from
wrong, test. Indeed, the statute appears to exist merely to emphasize that South Carolina's definition
of insanity does not include any volitional aspect.
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
10. The irresistible impulse test is a common-law legacy that began with the case of Parsons v.
State, 2 So. 854 (Ala. 1887). The Alabama Supreme Court criticized the exclusive use of the
M'Naghten test, see infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text, to determine insanity because that test
considered only cognitive factors. The court reasoned that in light of the then current scientific studies
on diseases of the brain, a person could be "so far under the duress of such [mental] disease as to
destroy thepower to choose between right andwrong." Id. at 859. Hence, the volitional or irresistible
impulse test was born and has remained substantially unchanged. Under this test, defendants may be
found not guilty by reason of insanity if they can prove that they were unable to conform their behavior
to within the requirements of the law. See, e.g., ARK. CODEANN. § 5-2-312(a) (Michie 1997) (defining
insanity to include an inability to conform behavior to the law). Some states include this test in their
definition of insanity; others completely reject any form of irresistible impulse test as a part of an
insanity defense. See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 60 (1981) (detailing the requirements
of the irresistible impulse test); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 99 (1989) (discussing the common law
irresistible impulse test).
11. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312(a) (Michie 1997) (defining insanity as including an
inability to conform behavior to law); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13(a) (West 1994) (excusing
[Vol. 49:10951096
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M'Naghten test.'2 The M'Naghten test declares that a person is legally insane if at
the time of the alleged act and "as a result of mental disease or defect, [the
defendant] lacked the capacity to distinguish moral or legal right from moral or
legal wrong or to recognize the particular act charged as morally or legally
wrong."' 3 In light of this definition, the South Carolina General Assembly makes
clear that a person who is guilty but mentally ill does not qualify as insane.
The South Carolina Supreme Court stated that the GBMI statute seeks "(1) to
reduce the number of defendants being completely relieved of criminal
responsibility and (2) to insure mentally ill inmates receive treatment for their
benefit as well as society's benefit while incarcerated."' 4 South Carolina sentences
defendants convicted under the GBMI statute as if they had received straight guilty
verdicts; indeed, South Carolina will sentence GBMI defendants to death.' 5
However, GBMI inmates are supposed to receive mental health treatment before
incarceration with the general prison population.' 6 Additionally, when a defendant
raises an insanity defense, the court must instruct the jury on-and the jury must be
allowed to find the defendant-guilty but mentally ill.'7 Despite the superficial
guise that a GBMI verdict is a less harsh form of verdict, Hornsby would probably
agree with the conclusion that GBMI verdicts are not necessarily a blessing to
defendants.
criminal conduct when the defendant was unable "to control his conduct within the requirements of the
law"); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962) (including inability to conform behavior to law
within definition of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility).
12. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). South Carolina has persisted in
maintaining this test as evidenced by the supreme court's decision in State v. Cannon, 260 S.C. 537,
197 S.E.2d 678 (1973). In Cannon the court adhered to the M'Naghten test, essentially stating that the
particular test recited to laypersons was not critical as the jury would first determine guilt, then decide
whether the defendant's mental condition should excuse the conduct based on their own common sense.
Id. at 547-48, 197 S.E.2d at 682.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp, 1997). South Carolina is not alone in
adopting this definition. For example, the Illinois insanity statute provides that "[a] person is not
criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental
defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/6-2(a) (West Supp. 1997). Additionally, the federal insanity statute defines insanity as one's
inability "to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts." 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994).
14. State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 126,484 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1997); see also State v. Wilson,
306 S.C. 498, 503,413 S.E.2d 19,22 (1992) (stating thatthese objectives are "well established" as "the
purposes for the enactment of GBMI statutes nationwide").
15. See Wilson, 306 S.C. at 515, 413 S.E.2d at 29 (affirming the GBMI defendant's death
sentence).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-70(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); see also State v. Rimert, 315 S.C.
527, 531,446 S.E.2d 400,402 (1994) (holding that the defendant "cannot waive a GBMI verdict form
once he has raised the issue of sanity"). The rule requiring that a jury must be allowed to find a
defendant GBMI contradicts the principle that a jury may only be instructed on a defense if evidence
of that defense has been presented. See I HON. EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE
AND INSTRUCTIONS § 7.02, at 210-11 (4th ed. 1992). Although this issue merits acknowledgment, it is
beyond the scope of this Note.
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B. The Case: State v. Homsby
In State v. Hornsby the jury found the defendant guilty but mentally ill of
murder and first degree burglary. 8 Prior to trial, Hornsby moved the court to
declare the GBMI statute unconstitutional under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.'9 The defense introduced
evidence that GBMI inmates sentenced under the GMBI statute received no
advantage over guilty defendants; therefore, the statute failed its purpose and was
unconstitutional. 0 Hornsby further argued that the GBMI verdict was a form of
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment as it created a "stigma"
on GBMI inmates and resulted in longer overall sentences.2 The trial court rejected
these arguments and Homsby was found guilty but mentally ill and sentenced to two
consecutive life terms.' The defendant appealed his conviction and renewed his
arguments that the guilty but mentally ill statute was unconstitutional.' In his
appellate brief, Homsby argued for the first time24 that the GBMI verdict was a
compromise verdict that allowed reasonable jurors to believe that it "stands
somewhere between an insanity verdict and a guilty verdict,"25 thus distracting the
jury from the only two true verdicts: guilty or not guilty.26 The defendant
maintained that this "'pseudo-verdict"'27 interfered with his due process rights and
Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial.28
The State responded with several counter arguments. First, the prosecution
contended that the defendant's pseudo verdict and compromise verdict arguments
had not been brought before the lower court and thus were not preserved for
appeal.29 The State also claimed that the defendant had apparently abandoned the
constitutional arguments made in both his pre-trial motion and during trial because
they were not set forth in Appellant's Final Brief.3" Regardless, the State contended
that the allegations were meritless because GBMI inmates receive the benefit of
mental health treatment before being placed into the general prison population and
because the issues raised by the defendant were "not questions of
constitutionality."'" The prosecution further argued that the statute was rationally
18. State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 124, 484 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1997).
19. See Record at 869.
20. Hornsby, 326 S.C. at 124-25, 484 S.E.2d at 871.
21. Id. at 125 & n.1, 484 S.E.2d at 871 & n.1.
22. Id. at 124-25, 484 S.E.2d at 871.
23. See Final Brief of Appellant at 5.
24. Id. at 7-9.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id. at 9-10.
27. Id. at 9.
28. Id.
29. Final Brief of Respondent at 6.
30. Id. at 14.
31. Id. at 15.
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designed by the South Carolina General Assembly to meet legitimate state
purposes.
32
The Supreme Court of South Carolina accepted the prosecution's arguments
and held the GBMI statute constitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.33 However, the supreme court did not determine whether
the statute violated the defendant's equal protection rights or constituted cruel and
unusual punishment because these issues were not properly preserved for on
appeal. 4 The supreme court further noted that Homsby had not requested a jury
instruction explaining the differences or similarities between the sentencing
consequences ofa GBMI verdict and a straight guilty verdict.35 The court concluded
that the GBMI statute was rationally designed to meet the General Assembly's
purposes.3 6 In so ruling, the supreme court determined that "[t]he GBMI statute
simply recognizes the continuum in the law regarding mental illness and provides
a guide for ajury when considering whether a defendant is not guilty; not guilty by
reason of insanity... ; guilty but mentally ill... ; or guilty.
37
III. ANALYSIS
4. The Constitutional ssues: Due Process Under the Fourteenth 4mendment
The South Carolina Supreme Court addressed only whether the GBMI statute
was constitutional under the Due Process Clause.38 Due process challenges are
generally analyzed under either a rational basis or strict scrutiny standard.39 Relying
on precedent, the South Carolina Supreme Court quickly determined that the
rational basis standard was the appropriate test.4 The rational basis standard
requires only that the statute in question "be reasonably designed to accomplish its
purposes."A' The rational basis test accords great deference to the legislature;
indeed, courts normally interpret the law in a manner necessary to save the statute.42
However, if the court determines that a challenged statute infringes upon a
fundamental constitutional right, the court will use strict scrutiny in its analysis.
43
32. Id. at 15-20.
33. State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 129, 484 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1997).
34. Id. at 125 n.1, 484 S.E.2d at 871 n.1.
35. Id. at 129, 484 S.E.2d at 873.
36. Id. at 126, 484 S.E.2d at 872.
37. Id. at 126-27, 484 S.E.2d at 872.
38. Id. at 125 & n.1,484 S.E.2d at 871 & n.l.
39. See JOHN E. NowAK& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrtmONAL LAW § 10.6, at 347-48 (5th
ed. 1995).
40. Hornsby, 326 S.C. at 125-26, 484 S.E.2d at 872.
41. Id. at 125, 484 S.E.2d at 872.
42. University of South Carolina v. Mehlman, 245 S.C. 180, 185, 139 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1964)
("[A] statute will, if possible, be construed so as to render it valid.").
43. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (noting that the violation of a
fundamental liberty interest will only be upheld if the infringement "is narrowly tailored to serve a
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Because the supreme court employed the rational basis test in Hornsby," its
application to South Carolina's GBMI statute will be addressed first, followed by
a strict scrutiny analysis.
1. The Rational Basis Test
Under the rational basis test, the GBMI statute passes muster in light of the
deference given to legislative enactments. Assuming arguendo that a fundamental
constitutional right is not being infringed upon, the General Assembly can claim a
legitimate state interest not only in protecting society from dangerous persons
released under insanity acquittals but also in providing help for mentally ill persons.
However, the GBMI statute may not be reasonably related to achieve these goals.
a. Legislative Purpose: Decreasing the Number
Relieved of Criminal Responsibility
In enacting the GBMI statute, the South Carolina General Assembly sought first
to lower the number of persons "being completely relieved of criminal
responsibility."4 How does the GBMI statute achieve this goal when the definition
of insanity has not changed? If ajury determines that a defendant is legally insane,
then the defendant is not criminally responsible.46 Thus, this legislative purpose
implies that juries disregard the statutory definition of insanity and acquit persons
that should be found guilty. Perhaps, however, by enacting this law the General
Assembly hoped to lead a jury into rendering a GBMI verdict,47 which is, in the
end, a guilty verdict.48
The GBMI verdict purportedly "clarifies for the jury" the different levels of
mental illness and, thus, results in more accurate convictions and, in some cases,
acquittals.49 In Hornsby the State advanced this argument,"° relying on the case of
compelling state interest").
44. Hornsby, 326 S.C. at 125-26, 484 S.E.2d at 872.
45. Id. at 126, 484 S.E.2d at 872. However, little information is available which indicates that
South Carolina ever had a problem with persons that were relieved of criminal responsibility.
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
47. In State v. McWilliams, 352 S.E.2d 120 (W. Va. 1986), the West Virginia Supreme Court
indicated its displeasure that a mentally ill defendant would be acquitted as a result of its decision. Id.
at 130. The court noted that it was "troubled by this prospect, but no alternative exists under West
Virginia law." Id. The court also examined how other states dealt with this problem and noted that
"[o]ther states have developed the compromise verdict of'guilty but mentally ill.' We believe this only
muddies the water. The accused was either criminally responsible or not criminally responsible by
reason of insanity." Id. n.16 (citations omitted).
48. Hornsby, 326 S.C. at 126, 484 S.E.2d at 872.
49. See, e.g., State v. Neely, 819 P.2d 249, 252 (N.M. 1991) (stating that the GBMI "verdict
clarifies" mental illness issues for jury).
50. See Final Brief of Respondent at 17-19.
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State v. Neely."' InNeelytheNew Mexico Supreme Court upheld its GBMI statute52
under the rational basis test 3 when the defendant challenged the statute on
essentially three due process grounds. 4 First, the defendant alleged that the GBMI
statute satisfied no legitimate state purpose; second, it created jury confusion; and
third, it created the risk of a jury compromise verdict.5 The New Mexico court
suggested that the state's legislative purpose in enacting the GBMI statute was "to
reduce the number of improper or inaccurate insanity acquittals and to give jurors
an alternative to acquittal when mental illness is believed to play a part in an
offense."5 6 The court concluded that the statute increased the jury's chances of
returning a more accurate verdict, which is a legitimate state interest.57 In
conclusion, the Neely court quickly dispensed with the defendant's remaining
arguments, stating that the GBMI verdict created neither jury confusion nor
compromise.5
Neely is distinguishable. The Neely court found that the GBMI verdict assisted
the jury in understanding the gradations of legal culpability. 9 New Mexico's
statutory definition of insanity includes the inability of defendants to conform their
behavior to the law.' Because this definition is very broad and could easily produce
the acquittal of defendants under an insanity plea, additional jury guidance might
be warranted. South Carolina's definition of insanity,6 however, is narrow and so
no gradations of culpability could be provided by South Carolina's GBMI statute.
In South Carolina a defendant found either guilty or guilty but mentally ill is
deemed to possess the same degree of mens rea or culpability. 2 Apparently, the
South Carolina General Assembly is expanding the definition of guilt, not mental
illness. In light of this, the relationship between the GBMI statute and the General
51. 819 P.2d 249 (N.M. 1991).
52. Id. at 256. The New Mexico statute provides in pertinent part:
A person who at the time of the commission of a criminal offense was not insane
but was suffering from a mental illness is not relieved of criminal responsibility
for his conduct and may be found guilty but mentally ill. As used in this section,
"mentally ill" means a substantial disorder of thought, mood or behavior which
afflicted a person at the time of the commission of the offense and which
impaired that person's judgment, but not to the extent that he did not know what
he was doing or understand the consequences of his act or did not know that his
act was wrong or could not prevent himself from committing the act.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3(A) (Michie 1984).
53. As in Hornsby, the defendant in Neely did not argue that heightened scrutiny was appropriate.
Neely, 819 P.2d at 252 n.5.
54. Id. at 251.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 252.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 253-54.
59. Neely, 819 P.2d at 253.
60. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3(A) (Michie 1984).
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
62. State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 128, 484 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1997).
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Assembly's goal of reducing the number of defendants relieved of criminal
responsibility does not appear completely reasonable.
b. Legislative Purpose: Providing Mental Health Care
The second stated goal of the statute is to provide mental health care for GBMI
inmates." Although this goal may be legitimate, the GBMI statute once again is not
entirely reasonably or rationally related to achieve it. The provision advancing
mental health care is found in a GBMI companion sentencing statute, which
requires that GBMI inmates receive mental health evaluations and treatment before
entering the inmate general population.'
In reality, the GBMI statute has very little impact on the treatment of mentally
ill inmates because the South Carolina Department of Corrections provides a tiered
system of mental health care treatment for all inmates.65 An initial battery of tests
is administered to every inmate to determine whether the inmate needs any form of
physical or mental health care and where the inmate should be placed within the
correctional system.66 After this initial phase, those in need move on to secondary
counseling or, in acute cases, the male inmates' are sent to the South Carolina
Department of Correction's mental health hospital and the female inmates to the
Department of Mental Health.67 Upon arriving at one of these mental health
institutions, the inmates are further evaluated, assessed, and given any needed
treatment for the necessary amount of time.68 The only difference in treatment
between mentally ill inmates and GBMI inmates is the GBMI inmates' mandatory
evaluation; they are evaluated at the South Carolina Department of Correction's
mental health hospital even if this is unnecessary.69 The Hornsby court noted,
however, that the "statute is not rendered a nullity" just because guilty but not
mentally ill inmates are provided treatment if needed.70
Despite these potential issues, the GBMI statute undoubtedly passes muster
because the traditional rational basis analysis requires such a low level of scrutiny.
Under rational basis, the legislature need not actually achieve the desired purposes;
instead, the legislature need only provide some reasonable link between the statute
and the purpose.7' However, these issues may create a problem for the GBMI
63. Id. at 126, 484 S.E.2d at 872.
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-70(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
65. Interview with Wanda D. Tarpley, Director, and Steve Woodward, Associate Director,
Division of Behavioral Medicine for the South Carolina Department of Corrections, in Columbia, S.C.
(Feb. 25, 1998).
66. Id.
67. Id. The South Carolina Department of Corrections mental health hospital is located at
Kirkland Correctional Facility. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 127, 484 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1997).
71. See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 39, at 347 ("If the law can arguably be said to
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statute if it were subject to a more stringent level of scrutiny. Because the GBMI
statute appears to infringe upon a defendant's liberty interest and fundamental right
to a fair jury trial in a criminal proceeding, the application of a strict scrutiny
analysis may be more appropriate.
2. The Strict Scrutiny Test
The Hornsby court noted that "[a]ppellant properly does not claim [that] a
suspect class or fundamental right are implicated by the GBMI statute."72
Fundamental rights are defined as those rights which are "'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty"' to the extent that "'neither liberty nor justice would exist if
[they] were sacrificed."' 73 Fundamental rights can also be defined as those "liberties
that are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'74 Because Hornsby
did not raise a fundamental rights argument,7" the court applied a rational basis test76
and upheld the statute.77 When legislation infringes upon a fundamental right, such
as the Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial, the reviewing court strictly scrutinizes
the legislation.7" Strict scrutiny requires that the challenged governmental action be
necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental objective.79
Horsby could have made a persuasive argument that the GBMI verdict infringed
upon his liberty interest and his Sixth Amendment right to a fair jury trial.
a. Interference With the Fundamental Right to a Fair Trial
The GBMI verdict appears to infringe upon a defendant's fundamental right to
a fair trial in a criminal proceeding. The United States Supreme Court uses the
fundamental rights approach to determine which amendments are selectively
incorporated and applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment."0 The
rationally relate to a legitimate goal of government, the Court will uphold the law even though the
Justices might disagree with the wisdom of its provisions.").
72. Hornsby, 326 S.C. at 126 n.2, 484 S.E.2d at 872 n.2.
73. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969)).
74. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977) (Powell, J.)).
75. Hornsby, 326 S.C. at 126 n.2, 484 S.E.2d at 872 n.2.
76. Walker v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 320 S.C. 496,500,466 S.E.2d
346, 348 (1995) ("This Court is not entitled to scrutinize reasonable measures unless some fundamental
right is implicated.").
77. Hornsby, 326 S.C. at 130, 484 S.E.2d at 874.
78. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (noting that the violation of a
fundamental liberty interest will only be upheld if the infringement "is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest"); see also NowAK&RTUNDA, supra note 39, § 11.7 (stating that the Court
will apply strict scrutiny to governmental action involving a fundamental right).
79. Flores, 507 U.S. at 302.
80. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
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Court has determined that the right to a jury trial in a criminal proceeding is a
fundamental right and as such is protected from state infringement."' The South
Carolina GBMI statute infringes on this right by creating a compromise verdict,
which is ripe forjury misperception and misunderstanding in two critical areas: (1)
the degree of culpability, or mens rea, necessary for a GBMI verdict and (2) the
eventual disposition of the defendant receiving a GBMI verdict.
i. Jury Misperception: Mens Rea and Culpability
Because thejury is given four choices-guilty, guilty but mentally ill, not guilty
by reason of insanity, or not guilty-the jury may believe that the GBMI verdict lies
somewhere between guilty and not guilty.82 Recently, this reasoning compelled the
Illinois Court of Appeals in People v. Robles3 to disregard a long line of state case
law and hold the state's GBMI statute unconstitutional.' In the past, Illinois courts
repeatedly ruled that the GBMI statute did not threaten a fundamental right;
therefore, they refused to apply heightened scrutiny.8" In Robles the defendant
appealed his GBMI conviction,86 alleging that the GBMI statute resulted in
compromise verdicts thatviolated his FourteenthAmendmentrightto due process.
The court agreed, finding that GBMI verdicts do not "reflect diminished culpability
or criminal responsibility."88 The Robles court began its analysis by citing
Sandstrom v. Montana89 for the proposition that "a statute [which] encourages
compromise verdicts based upon jurors' misperceptions and misunderstandings is
a violation of due process."9 In Sandstrom the Court reasoned that "whether a
defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in
which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction."'" While the facts
of Sandstrom distinguish it from GBMI cases,' Sandstrom's principle is on point.
The Supreme Court has apparently endorsed the ideathat a defendant's fundamental
rights are violated when the jury could have been misled or ajury instruction could
have been misperceived.
Jury misinterpretation appeared to be at issue in Hornsby. Because a defendant
81. Id. at 149.
82. Final Brief of Appellant at 8.
83. 682 N.E.2d 194 (App. Ct. 1997), cert. granted, 686 N.E.2d 1170 (Ill. Oct.1, 1997).
84. Id. at 205.
85. See, e.g., People v. Seaman, 561 N.E.2d 188, 197-98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (applying rational
basis test and upholding the constitutionality of state GBMI statute).
86. Robles, 682 N.E.2d at 195.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 204.
89. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
90. Robles, 682 N.E.2d at 204.
91. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514.
92. In Sandstrom the defendant challenged a jury instruction because it lead the jury to believe
that the state was entitled to a presumption that would have relieved the state from proving all of the
elements of a crime. Id. at 513.
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is sentenced as though receiving a straight guilty verdict,93 any distinction between
a GBMI verdict and a guilty verdict is essentially illusory.94 South Carolina refuses
to allow jury instructions comparing the disposition of the GBMI verdict and the
straight guilty verdict.9" As a result, the jury may labor under a misperception that
different levels of culpability exist. This misperception prevents a jury from
rendering a true verdict and thus interferes with a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights. The mens rea or culpability aspect of the GBMI statute is not the only area
that is ripe for jury misperception. Concerns over the defendant's eventual
disposition may encourage a jury to render a GBMI verdict believing that it
provides a less harsh sentence and offers a defendant special treatment.
ii. Jury Misperception: Disposition of the Defendant
GBMI statutes may also mislead the jury concerning the disposition of the
defendant. The Robles court noted that the "GBMI verdict is identical to a 'guilty'
verdict in terms of potential punishment and/or psychiatric treatment";96 indeed,
GBMI inmates receive the same treatment as other inmates.97 Based upon these
observations, the court determined that the GBMI verdict had "no practical
effect."98 Summing up, the court opined:
We have little doubt that conscientious jurors who are confronted with
this continuum of verdicts assume that the GBMI verdict represents a
distinct and separate position on this continuum. In all probability, they
further assume that the GBMI verdict indicates that some sort of
ameliorative disposition will be afforded the defendant. We find that these
misconceptions and misunderstandings encourage a compromise verdict
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
94. Rimert v. Mortell, 680 N.E.2d 867, 875-76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Rimert, a medical
malpractice case, arose out of the same underlying facts as the South Carolina decision in State v.
Rimert, 315 S.C. 527, 446 S.E.2d 400 (1994). The Indiana Court of Appeals, interpreting South
Carolina law for purposes of determining the merits of the case before it, noted that the South Carolina
GBMI verdict contemplated the same degree of culpability as a straight guilty verdict and opined that
"[o]ne might validly argue that a verdict of guilty but mentally ill is an illusory recognition of one's
diminished capacity, rendering the actual degree of culpability meaningless." Rimert, 680 N.E.2d at
875-76. The South Carolina case of State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 413 S.E.2d 19 (1992), further
illustrates this point. In Wilson the South Carolina Supreme Court determined that a GBMI defendant
could be sentenced to death. Id. at 508-09, 413 S.E.2d at 25.
95. State v. Poindexter, 314 S.C. 490, 492, 431 S.E.2d 254, 255 (1993) ("[C]onsequences of a
verdict are of no concern to the jury."); State v. Huiett, 271 S.C. 205, 207-08, 246 S.E.2d 862, 864
(1978) (explaining that the jury's duty is to determine defendant's guilt; therefore, an instruction on
verdict consequences generally does not aid in that process).
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of GBI, which is devoid of any substance.
... Moreover, the very title of the GBMI statute encourages jurors to
draw natural inferences from it.99
This same reasoning applies to the South Carolina GBMI statute. Consequently,
South Carolina juries may also be misled. The South Carolina Supreme Court has
held that jurors do not need to know the sentencing consequences of different
verdicts"0 because it is not the jury's concern.'0 ' In most cases, the jury may not
need dispositional information unless it is involved in the sentencing phase of the
trial. However, cases involving GBMI verdicts raise special concerns and should
be treated differently. Apparently, the function of the GBMI verdict is to appeal to
the jury's compassion concerning the eventual disposition of the defendant, and yet
GBMI defendants are sentenced as though they are simply guilty."w Ideally, ajury
should not consider the disposition of the defendant when determining guilt. As a
result, no clarifying instructions would be necessary. Yet, by providing thejury with
a verdict that alludes to an alternative disposition, the GBMI statute seems to cause
the jury to take the defendant's disposition into account. Perhaps the General
Assembly had no confidence that ajury would find truly culpable defendants guilty.
The legislative solution, however, treads on a defendant's fundamental rights.
Therefore, as a practical matter, courts should instruct juries concerning the
differences between guilty and GBMI, orjuries should not be given a GBMI option.
At least one state has recognized these misleading aspects of a GBMI statute
and has enacted a rule of criminal procedure so that in cases in which the
defendant's sanity is at issue, the jury may receive instruction concerning the
different dispositional possibilities of insanity and GBMI verdicts." 3 Such
instruction may help eliminate jury confusion and jury speculation about the
different verdicts, provided the instruction explains that guilty and GBMI verdicts
evoke essentially the same penalty and require the same degree of guilt. Without
such an instruction, the existence of the GBMI verdict diverts the jury from its true
function of determining guilt or innocence by offering what appears as both a third
99. Id. at 205. However, not all of the judges agreed with this conclusion. In his dissent, Judge
Thomas exhumed the weighty list of Illinois state precedent that had consistently rejected the very
arguments made by the defendant. Id. at 206-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Clearly, Judge Thomas would
uphold the GBMI statute under a rational basis test. See id. at 208 The Illinois Supreme Court has
granted certiorari; thus, the fate of the Illinois GBMI statute remains uncertain.
100. See, e.g., State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 129,484 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1997) ("[l']he function
of a jury is to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty and the consequences of a
conviction are of no aid in determining whether the defendant committed the offense.").
101. Id.
102. Id. at 126, 484 S.E.2d at 872.
103. See ICY. REV. STAT. ANN. R. 9.55 (Michie 1998) ("[TI]he court shall instruct the jury at the
guilt/innocent phase as to the dispositional provisions applicable to the defendant if the jury returns a
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level of culpability and a dispositional option. The American Bar Association,
which opposes the enactment of GBMI statutes, criticizes the legislation on similar
grounds. The Illinois Appellate Court quoted the ABA:
[The GBMI verdict is n]ot a proper verdict at all. Rather it is a
dispositional mechanism transferred to the guilt determination phase of the
criminal process. The hybrid nature of the verdict is demonstrated by the
fact that a jury determination of mental illness at the time of a charged
offense is relevant not to criminal responsibility or culpability but to
whether the accused persons might receive treatment after they have been
sentenced .'..."
Although never properly faced with an overt fundamental rights argument, the
South Carolina Supreme Court has probably already rejected any such attempt. In
a footnote in Hornsby, the court reasoned that a defendant's liberty interest is not
implicated because the defendant's liberty has already been "curtailed" by the jury
when it found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' °5 However, this begs the question.
If juries are being misled and distracted from a tue determination of guilt or
innocence, then it is questionable whether juries, when rendering GBMI verdicts,
actually determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If a court agrees that the GBMI
verdict does infringe upon a defendant's fundamental rights, it is doubtful that the
statute could survive a court's ensuing strict scrutiny analysis, which requires a
statute to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental purpose.0 6
b. Compelling Government Purpose and Narrowly Tailored
Requirements
The GBMI statute appears to be neither necessary nor narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling governmental interest. Furthermore, the State would have the
burden of establishing that its interests were "compelling,"' °7 which may prove
difficult. To preserve its goal of reducing the number of individuals relieved of
criminal responsibility,' ° the State would undoubtedly argue that the government
has a compelling interest in protecting society from dangerous, mentally ill
defendants that are improperly acquitted as insane. However, the State may be
required to prove that persons acquitted as insane had previously been a problem.
104. People v. Robles, 682 N.E.2d 194, 194 (App. Ct. 1997) (quoting ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARD 7-6.10 commentary at 393-94 (1989)), cert. granted, 686 N.E.2d 1170
(III. Oct. 1, 1997).
105. Hornsby, 326 S.C. at 126 n.2, 484 S.E.2d at 872 n.2.
106. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
107. Id.
108. Hornsby, 326 S.C. at 126, 484 S.E.2d at 872. The Illinois legislature enacted its GBMI
statute for substantially the same purposes as South Carolina. Robles, 682 N.E.2d at 202.
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Specifically, the State would have to provide statistics showing a number of
inappropriate insanity acquittals as well as showing how the involuntary
commitment statute for these acquitted individuals was inadequate. Additionally,
the State would likely argue that providing treatment for the mentally ill is a
compelling governmental interest. Although arguably compelling, the State may
still have to show how this mental health interest is compelling in light of the
existing system for treating the mentally ill in the state correctional system. Whether
the State could sufficiently convince a court of the compelling nature of these two
purposes is uncertain.
The means chosen by the government to achieve its compelling purpose must
be narrowly tailored to pass a strict scrutiny test."° Assuming that the reduction in
the number of defendants being relieved of criminal responsibility is a compelling
governmental purpose, a reduction can still be achieved via less restrictive means.
In its present form, the GBMI verdict serves only to increase jury confusion
concerning mentally ill defendants by providing a jury with the options of guilty,
guilty but mentally ill, not guilty by reason of insanity, and not guilty."' Possible
solutions exist that may help tailor the GBMI statute and provide mentally ill
defendants with fairer treatment.
i. Alternative Methods: Jury Instructions Regarding
Disposition
The General Assembly could achieve its goals with less infringement on the
rights of defendants by amending the GBMI statute to include a mandatory jury
instruction about the defendant's possible dispositions under a guilty verdict and
under a GBMI verdict. The jury instruction should specifically state that under each
possible verdict, guilt must still be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an
instruction would help eliminate jury confusion and speculation on what makes a
GBMI verdict distinct from a straight guilty verdict.
ii. Alternative Methods: Redefine Insanity
Redefining insanity may also provide a more narrowly tailored alternative. A
new definition, provided to the jury in an instruction, should make it clear that
defendants that know right from wrong, but cannot conform their conduct to the
requirements of the law, are simply guilty. Any form of mental illness not rising to
the level of insanity is not a defense to guilt. Because defendants that receive GBMI
verdicts are sentenced as if they had received a straight guilty verdict, the instruction
should also inform the jury that in most cases a judge may take many factors,
including mental illness that does not rise to the level of insanity, into account when
109. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
110. S.C. CODEANN. § 17-24-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
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determining the defendant's sentence."' This instruction informs thejury that it may
encounter a defendant who is obviously mentally ill, but that it is the jury's duty to
find a defendant guilty if the defendant's mental state does not meet the statutory
definition of insanity. The judge may then consider the defendant's mental state as
a mitigating factor. This potential solution would further the General Assembly's
goal of providing GBMI inmates with mental health care because judges have, in
the past, recommended or ordered mental health treatment for particular
defendants. 2 These orders or recommendations have the same effect on an
inmate's treatment within the Department of Corrections as labels such as GBMI."3
iii. Alternative Methods: Automatic Commitment Statutes
Finally, the General Assembly could repeal the GBMI statute and apply the
existing automatic commitment statute that currently only applies to defendants
acquitted as insane.' However, this alternative does not achieve the General
Assembly's purpose of preventing individuals from being relieved of criminal
responsibility."5 However, if the ultimate goal was simply to reduce the number of
dangerous, mentally ill persons released under the insanity defense, then the
automatic commitment statute would appear sufficient.
While these suggestions may be less than clear solutions to the due process
concerns raised by the GBMI statute, defendants have cause for alarm when they
are faced with ajury that could misperceive the true nature of a GBMI verdict.
B. The Constitutional Issues: Equal Protection Under the
Fourteenth Amendment
Hornsby alleged in his pre-trial motion and at trial that the GBMI statute
violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment."' On appeal,
he appeared to abandon completely his equal protection challenge. "7 Consequently,
111. State v. Green, 220 S.C. 315,322,67 S.E.2d 509,512 (1951) ("mhe court, before imposing
sentence, [should] hear evidence with reference to any relevant facts in aggravation or mitigation of
punishment.").
112. Interview with Wanda D. Tarpley and Steve Woodward, supra note 65.
113. Id. Both Ms. Tarpley and Mr. Woodward mentioned that simple things, such as mental
health records or records of behavior during prior incarceration, would likely produce the same sort of
"flag" and trigger the appropriate treatment. Id.
114. Section 17-24-40 of the South Carolina Code provides that a defendant acquitted under an
insanity verdict must be committed to a mental health institution for no more than 120 days.
Confinement beyond that time can be achieved through subsequent judicial evaluations to determine
if further hospitalization is necessary. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Automatic
commitment statutes have been upheld by the Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354,
370 (1983).
115. State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 126, 484 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1997).
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the supreme court did not address the issue."
Although Hornsby did not pursue the equal protection issue, he probably should
have because South Carolina's system of classifying the mentally ill may be
impermissible under the Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment .. generally ensures that "persons similarly situated should
be treated alike.' 120 Under equal protection, three levels of review are applicable:
strict scrutiny,' 2' middle level scrutiny," and rational basis scrutiny.1" Strict
scrutiny is triggered when the government bases a classification on a suspect class
or creates a classification that infringes upon a fundamental right.'24 Middle level
review is used in cases involving quasi-suspect classifications. 125 Absent these
triggering characteristics, the challenged law or governmental action is analyzed
using a rational basis test.
26
Had the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the equal protection issue,
it probably would have relied on the United States Supreme Court case of City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.127 and applied a form of rational basis
analysis. In City of Cleburne the Supreme Court refused to treat legislation that
targeted the mentally retarded as impermissibly classifying a suspect or quasi
suspect class.22 Despite this conclusion, the Court actually applied what appeared
to be a heightened form of rational basis scrutiny, invalidating the statute in
question.'29 In light of City of Cleburne, the most appropriate level of scrutiny for
Hornsby appears to be a form of heightened rational basis.
The rational basis standard normally requires that a law be reasonably or
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. 3° Traditionally, courts do
nothing more than determine "whether a classification is wholly arbitrary,"''
thereby placing a nearly insurmountable task upon those challenging the law.
However, the Supreme Court has occasionally affixed a label of rational basis on
its analysis and then actually applied a somewhat more stringent standard.'32
118. Id.
119. U.S.CoNsT. amend. IV, § 1.
120, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,439 (1985).
121. Id. at 440.
122. Id. at 441.
123. Id. at 440.
124. Id. at 440.
125. Id. at 441.
126. NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 39, § 14.3.
127. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
128. Id. at 442.
129. Id. at 448. But see Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993) (using a rational basis test
to uphold the constitutionality of a Kentucky statute that dealt with the commitment of the mentally
retarded after noting that no argument for a higher level of scrutiny was properly before it and stating
that the Court had applied a mere rational basis test in City of Cleburne).
130. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
131. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 39, § 14.3, at 608.
132. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-50.
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In City of Cleburne a Texas city denied a special use permit for the
establishment of a home for mentally retarded persons in an area where the city
allowed such permits for fraternities, nursing homes, and other specialty housing.'
The Supreme Court invalidated the ordinance under the rational basis analysis.'34
The Court recognized that states could have a legitimate interest in treating the
mentally retarded differently and that legislators were better suited than the courts
to evaluate and provide for the special needs of this diverse group. 3" However, the
Court also noted that "there have been and there will continue to be instances of
discrimination against the retarded that are in fact invidious, and that are properly
subject to judicial correction under constitutional norms."'36 The Texas ordinance
fell into the latter category. The Court invalidated the law when it determined that
the city had not proven that the proposed home for the mentally retarded posed "any
special threat to the city's legitimate interests."'37 With this conclusion, the Court
appeared to shift the burden of proof from the group attacking the ordinance to its
defenders, thus requiring the government to prove how its legitimate interests were
furthered by this law.
The city's alleged legitimate interests included the concerns of the would-be
neighbors of the home and concern for the well-being of the proposed-home's
occupants. 3 ' The Court rejected these alleged interests, reasoning that the home
could not be denied a permit based upon such "vague, undifferentiated fears."'39 In
short, the ordinance did not bear a rational relationship to the city's concerns. 40 The
Court concluded instead that the permit requirement rested on "an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded," '' and accordingly it struck down the
ordinance.
4 2
The Supreme Court has also held that "a bare ... desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."' 43 The same
principle was reiterated more recently in Romer v. Evans,'" in which the Court
invalidated an amendment to Colorado's state constitution 145 because the
133. Id. at 435, 449.
134. Id. at 448.
135. Id. at442-43. The Court named several laws aimed atthe protection, education, and, in some
cases, the restriction of the mentally retarded, stating that "[s]uch legislation thus singling out the
retarded for special treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences between the retarded and
others." Id. at 444.
136. Id. at 446.
137. Id. at 448.
138. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-49.
139. Id. at 449.
140. Id. at 148.
141. Id. at 450.
142. Id.
143. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
144. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
145. Id. at 635. The amendment provided:
"No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation.
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amendment prohibited governmental protection of gays and lesbians. 46 In Romer
the Court noted that "[i]n the ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it can be said
to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works
to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous."'47
The Court determined that the Colorado amendment did not meet even this low
standard and that it reflected nothing but discriminatory animus towards gays and
lesbians. 4 In conclusion, the Court found that the amendment did nothing more
than make gays and lesbians "unequal to everyone else"--and this could not be a
legitimate government interest.
49
The reasoning of these cases may make it difficult for South Carolina's GBMI
statute to pass a heightened rational basis test. Under this test, the purposes set forth
by the South Carolina General Assembly may fall short of legitimacy, leaning closer
to expressing animosity towards mentally ill defendants. Similar to the amendment
in Romer, the GBMI statute prevents the mentally ill from standing equally with
others. With the GBMI statute, the inequality is with respect to a fair jury trial. The
purposes underlying this statute were to reduce the number of insanity acquittals
and provide mental health care for GBMI inmates. 5 ° Without proof that the GBMI
statute could accomplish these goals, the law may rest on the same "vague and
undifferentiated fears"'' that led to the Court's invalidation of the Texas ordinance
in City of Cleburne.5
Defendants in other states have challenged GBMI statutes on equal protection
grounds, and many state courts have upheld their respective GBMI statutes under
a mere rational basis test.' State v. Neely' s4 is illustrative. In Neely the defendant
raised an equal protection claim, arguing that defendants acquitted under the
-Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim ofdiscrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects
self-executing."
Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b).
146. Id. at 623-24.
147. Id. at 632.
148. Id. at 634.
149. Id. at 635.
150. State v. Homsby, 326 S.C. 121, 126, 484 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1997).
151. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449 (1985).
152. Id. at 450.
153. See, e.g., Gambill v. State, 675 N.E.2d 668, 677 (Ind. 1997) (determining that the state's
GBMI statute did not violate the equal protection clause); State v. Neely, 819 P.2d 249, 255 (N.M.
1991) (upholding state's GBMI law under the rational basis test); Commonwealth v. Zewe, 663 A.2d
195, 200-01 (Pa. 1995) (holding that the state's GBMI statute bore a rational relationship to the state's
legitimate purpose of holding the mentally ill, yet not insane, responsible for their crimes).
154. 819 P.2d 249 (N.M. 1991).
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insanity defense and GBMI defendants were similarly situated because they were
all mentally ill.155 The defendant contended that the government had established an
impermissible classification-one in which some defendants are sent to prison and
others are not. 6 In addressing this argument, the New Mexico Supreme Court
upheld the statute under a rational basis test, specifically noting that
[t]he classification is rationally related to a legitimate interest-it allows
only those mentally ill who did not have the capacity to form the
appropriate criminal intent to avoid criminal liability while providing for
criminal liability for those guilty because they possessed the criminal
intent, yet who are nonetheless mentally ill. Although the classification
admittedly creates two classes of mentally-ill defendants, those classes are
not similarly situated and their legislative creation is not arbitrary. 157
The court described the traditional rational basis test as so low a level of scrutiny
that ".[o]nly when a statutory classification is so devoid of rational support or serves
no valid governmental interest, so that it amounts to mere caprice, will it be struck
down under the rational basis test."""s However, such a characterization is accurate
only when a traditional rational basis test is applied. If the South Carolina Supreme
Court had addressed the equal protection issue, it undoubtedly would have used the
rational basis standard and found that the government's purpose was not capricious.
C. The Constitutional Issues: Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the
Eighth Amendment
In his pre-trial motion, Hornsby claimed that the GBMI verdict violated the
Eighth Amendment. 9 He failed, however, to renew this argument in his final
appellate brief, and so the supreme court did not address the issue. 6 If Hornsby had
preserved this issue, he could have argued that inmates sentenced under the GBMI
statute are stigmatized and thus treated differently. Moreover, he could have argued
that GBMI inmates actually serve more time than inmates receiving guilty
verdicts.""
Even if the Eighth Amendment challenge had been preserved, it is unlikely that
155. Id. at 255.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 763 P.2d 1153, 1158 (N.M.
1988)).
159. See Record at 869. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S.
CoNsT. amend. VIII.
160. State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 125 n.1, 484 S.E.2d 869, 871 n.1 (1997).
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Hornsby would have prevailed in light of State v. Wilson.'62 The Wilson court was
asked to determine if a death sentence given to a GBMI inmate violated the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment.'63 The defendant in Wilson plead
GBMI to two counts of murder and multiple counts of assault and battery with
intent to kill after he shot teachers and children at an elementary school.' 64 The
court sentenced Wilson to death for the murder convictions.' 6' The defendant
appealed his death sentence, arguing that it violated the Eighth Amendment because
he was mentally ill and thus less culpable than a normal inmate.'" The court
disagreed, holding that it was not cruel and unusual punishment for the GBMI
defendant to receive the death sentence as he was "completely culpable and
responsible for his crimes."'67 In light of this ruling, Homsby would not have
prevailed under an Eighth Amendment argument.
IV. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the holding of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the GBMI statute
may be unconstitutional. First, the GBMI verdict violates due process because it
creates a compromise option that misleads the jury on both mens rea and
dispositional issues. Second, under a heightened rational basis scrutiny, the statute
may also violate equal protection because the State would bear the burden of
proving that the statute had legitimate purposes and was not the product of
animosity toward mentally ill defendants. The Eighth Amendment would notjustify
invalidating the GBMI statute. Although it is laudable that the General Assembly
tried to protect the public from dangerous, mentally ill defendants that may be
improperly acquitted as insane, this goal cannot be accomplished at the expense of
constitutional rights.
Reng J. LeBlanc-Allman
162. 306 S.C. 498, 413 S.E.2d 19 (1992).
163. Id. at 500, 413 S.E.2d at20.
164. Id. at 500-01, 413 S.E.2d at 20-21.
165. Id. at 501, 413 S.E.2d at 21.
166. Id. at 508, 413 S.E.2d at 25.
167. Id. at 509; 413 S.E.2d at 25.
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CORPUS DELICTI IN DUI CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
In City ofEasley v. Portman' the South Carolina Court of Appeals revisited an
issue that it had dealt with seventeen months before in State v. Osborne2 and
examined South Carolina's corpus delicti rule as it applies to driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquors (DUI) cases. In Portman the court purported to
reaffirm the long-standing "corroboration rule" that an extrajudicial confession by
a criminal defendant is not admissible until the State has established the corpus
delicti, or the body of the crime? However, by affirming a conviction based solely
on circumstantial evidence and the defendant's extrajudicial statements,4 the court,
in effect, demonstrated that adherence to the corpus delicti rule is a mere formality
in DUI cases
Traditionally, courts in DUI cases have recited the corpus delicti rule, but then
applied the rule to the facts in only the most cursory manner.' Because Osborne had
strictly applied the corpus delicti rule to a DUI case,6 however, the Portman court
faced a dilemma. Essentially, the court had to decide whether it would continue to
apply Osborne's stricter standard to corpus delicti determinations in DUI cases.
Interestingly, the court could not reach a clear consensus on this issue, and produced
three separate opinions, each offering its own solution. Writing for the court, Judge
C. Tolbert Goolsby distinguished Osborne and, in effect, returned the court to the
"mere formality" standard.! In a concurring opinion, Judge Ralph King Anderson
argued for an "admissions against interest" exception that would allow for a stricter
application of the rule, but would give the State a way to maneuver around it.8 In
dissent, Chief Judge William T. Howell advocated Osborne's strict application
standard.9 Therefore, the Portman opinions outlined three options for corpus delicti
in DUI cases: (1) theoretically retain the corpus delicti rule, but ignore it in reality;
(2) retain the rule, but adopt a broad "admissions" exception; or (3) retain and
rigorously apply the rule.
This Note argues that South Carolina should continue to apply the mere
1. 327 S.C. 593,490 S.E.2d 613 (Ct. App. 1997).
2. 321 S.C. 196,467 S.E.2d 454 (Ct. App. 1996), cert. granted, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 9 (S.C. Apr.
5, 1997).
3. Portman, 327 S.C. at 595, 490 S.E.2d at 614.
4. Id. at 598-99, 490 S.E.2d at 616.
5. For examples of cases giving such cursory treatment to the rule, see State v. Morgan, 282 S.C.
409,319 S.E.2d 335 (1984), State v. Gilliam, 270 S.C. 345,242 S.E.2d 410 (1978), State v. Townsend,
321 S.C. 55, 467 S.E.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1996), and State v. White, 311 S.C. 289, 428 S.E.2d 740 (Ct.
App. 1993).
6. Osborne, 321 S.C. at 199-201, 467 S.E.2d at 456-57.
7. Portman, 327 S.C. at 598-99, 490 S.E.2d at 616.
8. Id. at 599-614, 490 S.E.2d at 616-25 (Anderson, J., concurring in judgment).
9. Id. at 614-16, 490 S.E.2d at 625-26 (Howell, C.J., dissenting).
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formality standard to the corpus delicti rule in DUI cases because it is familiar,
flexible, and enjoys widespread support in other jurisdictions.'0 As a basis for this
discussion, Part II describes the factual and procedural background of Portman and
also examines the three Portman opinions. Parts III and IV, respectively, examine
the "admissions against interest" exception and the Osborne standard and argue
against the adoption of these standards in South Carolina. Finally, Part V
demonstrates that Portman follows familiar South Carolina case law, is in line with
the current treatment of similar DUI cases across the United States, and permits the
effective administration ofjustice.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Procedure
Although the facts of Portman are fairly typical of the "one-car accident" DUI
case," Portman contained one twist that required the court's scrutiny. Responding
to a call, Officer Ron Winegard arrived at the scene of a one-car accident and
discovered that a Ford Bronco had collided with a tree. 2 Because the car was still
"warm to his touch and [Winegard] could still smell the tires," he determined that
the car ran into the tree a few minutes before "his arrival at the scene."' 3 Cynthia
Gilstrap, the Bronco's registered owner, was at the scene as well as the defendant,
Steven Dale Portman. 4 Portman stood behind the wrecked vehicle, smelled of
alcohol, and slurred his speech. 5 Winegard suspected that an impaired driver had
caused the accident because of "the manner in which the Bronco had left the
road.""6 When Winegard asked Portman what happened, Portman answered, "'I was
driving the vehicle. I'm drunk, take me to jail.""' 7 Winegard then charged Portman
10. See, e.g., State v. DesLaurier, 630 A.2d 119, 128-29 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (establishing
corpus delicti when circumstantial evidence included the defendant driving a car earlier in the night and
being intoxicated when arrested); Burks v. State, 613 So. 2d 441,443 (Fla. 1993) (establishing corpus
delicti when the police found defendant at scene, defendant was intoxicated, and his truck illegally
blocked the highway); Regan v. State, 590 N.E.2d 640, 644 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (establishing corpus
delicti when defendant was found alone at scene of accident and alcohol discovered in the car); State
v. Gould, 704 P.2d 20, 30-31 (Mont. 1985) (establishing corpus delicti primarily on the basis of
bartender's testimony); Commonwealth v. Zelosko, 686 A.2d 825, 827 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(establishing corpus delicti when circumstantial evidence included the defendant's intoxication and a
witness first spotting the car 2000 feet from site where police later found it).
11. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 328 S.C. 622, 623-24, 493 S.E.2d 506, 507-08 (Ct. App. 1997)
(finding defendant intoxicated at the scene, but not in the driver's seat of vehicle); State v. Townsend,
321 S.C. 55, 58, 467 S.E.2d 138, 140 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding defendant intoxicated at the scene, but
not in the car).
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with DUI." At the jail, Portman refused to take a breathalyzer test. 9
The trial judge admitted Portman's statements into evidence, and the jury
convicted Portman of DUI ° On appeal, Portman argued that the prosecution had
failed to establish the corpus delicti of DUI,2 that his confession should thus not
have been admitted,' and that, without this confession, the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict.' The court of appeals, in a three opinion
decision, disagreed and affirmed the conviction.
B. The Judges' Opinions
Writing for the court, Judge Goolsby recited the well-established rule that the
prosecution must establish the corpus delicti before it can offer the defendant's
extrajudicial statements as evidence.24 Judge Goolsby cited State v. Speights for
the proposition that circumstantial evidence can establish the corpus delicti.26
Referring to the two most recent decisions on the subject,27 Judge Goolsby repeated
that "the corpus delicti of the offense of DUI consists of the following three
elements: (1) driving a vehicle; (2) within this State; and (3) while under the
influence of intoxicating liquors, drugs, or any other substance of like character.,
2
1
Relying solely on out-of-state authorities, 29 Judge Goolsby added that this first
element requires only a showing that someone, but not necessarily the defendant,
operated a vehicle while intoxicated." Turning to the case at hand, the court found
the following circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish the corpus delicti: the
vehicle had crashed into a tree; the arresting officer smelled alcohol on Portman's
breath and heard Portman slurring his speech; and the arresting officer suspected
that impaired driving caused the crash.3 Having determined that the facts in the
record sufficiently established the corpus delicti of DUI, the court concluded that






24. Portman, 327 S.C. at 595, 490 S.E.2d at 614.
25. 263 S.C. 127, 208 S.E.2d 43 (1974).
26. Portman, 327 S.C. at 595-96, 490 S.E.2d at 615.
27. Id. at 596, 490 S.E.2d at 615 (citing State v. Osborne, 321 S.C. 196, 467 S.E.2d 454 (Ct.
App. 1996), cert. granted, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 9 (S.C. Apr. 5, 1997); State v. Townsend, 321 S.C. 55,
467 S.E.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1996)).
28. Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2930 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (defining the offense of
driving under the influence).
29. Portman, 327 S.C. at 596,490 S.E.2d at 615 (citing State v. Stinnel, 800 S.W.2d 156 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990); State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175 (Utah 1977)).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 596-97, 490 S.E.2d at 615.
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the admission of Portman's statements did not constitute error 2 and so Portman's
conviction should therefore be affirmed.33
Judge Goolsby rejected Portman's reliance on State v. Osborne,34 a case in
which the corpus delicti rule had barred an extrajudicial confession,35 and found
Osborne's facts distinguishable.36 In Osborne the arresting officer did not find the
defendant at the scene37 and had no specific reason to suspect that impaired driving
caused the accident he discovered.38 Over two hours later, the police found Osborne
at a bar.39 Judge Goolsby agreed that this evidence in Osborne had been insufficient
to establish the corpus delicti.' In Portman, however, Officer Winegard found the
defendant intoxicated at the scene and believed an impaired operator caused the
wreck.4' Judge Goolsby believed that these facts effectively distinguished the case
from Osborne, thus allowing the jury verdict to stand.42
In a lengthy concurring opinion,43 Judge Anderson agreed that the prosecution
adequately established the corpus delicti through the circumstantial evidence
presented.' He further agreed that the connection of the accused with the offense
is not an element of the corpus delicti of a crime.45 However, Judge Anderson also
argued that South Carolina should apply an "admissions against interest" exception
to the corpus delicti rule, allowing "admissions" to be used as prima facie evidence
of the corpus delicti.46 Despite different reasoning, though, Judge Anderson agreed
with Judge Goolsby that the evidence supported Portman's conviction.47
In dissent, Chief Judge Howell agreed with the rest of the panel that the corpus
delicti rule applied, but he believed that the other judges were too lenient in its
application to the facts.48 Pointing out that "[s]ingle-car accidents can occur for
many different reasons,"49 Chief Judge Howell asserted that, absent Portman's
statements, the only evidence of DUI in the record consisted of the Bronco leaving
the road and crashing into a tree, the appearance of an intoxicated Portman in a
32. Id. at 597, 490 S.E.2d at 615.
33. Id. at 599, 490 S.E.2d at 616.
34. 321 S.C. 196,467 S.E.2d 454 (Ct. App. 1996), cert. granted, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 9 (S.C. Apr.
5, 1997).
35. Id. at 201, 467 S.E.2d at 457.
36. Portman, 327 S.C. at 598, 490 S.E.2d at 616.
37. Osborne, 321 S.C. at 198, 467 S.E.2d at 455.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Portman, 327 S.C. at 598, 490 S.E.2d at 616.
41. Id. at 595, 490 S.E.2d at 614.
42. Id. at 598-99, 490 S.E.2d at 616.
43. Id. at 599-614, 490 S.E.2d 616-25 (Anderson, J., concurring in judgment).
44. Id. at 613-14, 490 S.E.2d at 624.
45. Id. at 603, 490 S.E.2d at 618 (citing 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1110 (1989)).
46. Portman, 327 S.C. at 610, 490 S.E.2d at 622 (Anderson, J., concurring in judgment).
47. Id. at 613-14, 490 S.E.2d at 624.
48. Id. at 615, 490 S.E.2d at 625 (Howell, C.J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 616, 490 S.E.2d at 625.
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group at the scene, and Officer Winegard's conclusion that the driver was
impaired." Charging that to find evidence of DUI in "the 'manner in which the
Bronco had left the road'' required "an impermissible assumption [that] wrecks
are caused by drunk drivers,"52 Chief Judge Howell argued that Officer Winegard
offered no evidence to support his "bare conclusion that the accident was caused by
impaired driving." 3 Thus, the dissent concluded that the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish the corpus delicti of DUI. 4
III. THE "ADMISSIONS" EXCEPTION TO THE CORPUS DELICTI RULE
Although Judge Anderson's concurring opinion in Portman endorses the
corpus delicti rule, it presents an idea that carves a great hole in the rule: the
"admissions against interest exception." Under this exception, admissions against
interest, unlike confessions, would be admissible as prima facie evidence of the
corpus delicti5 6 In other words, whereas confessions would not be allowed into
evidence until the State had established some proof of the corpus delicti, the State
could use admissions against interest asproofofthe corpus delicti5 7 Obviously, this
exception, if adopted in South Carolina, would provide the State with a formidable
way to maneuver around the rule in DUI prosecutions. Thus, at first glance, the
exception seems desirable on policy grounds alone. Add to these policy benefits the
idea that courts will no longer need to wrestle with corpus delicti challenges to
extrajudicial admissions, and the admissions exception seems even more attractive.
However, a closer examination suggests that the exception may not be as useful or
pragmatic as it first appears.
First, and most significantly, the admissions exception does not necessarily ease
the court's job. The exception would, in some cases, eliminate the court's debate
about whether the State has established proof of the corpus delicti sufficient to
admit a confession. However, this elimination would not necessarily make the
court's task easier; indeed, the admissions exception would only replace the corpus
delicti decision with a tougher one: whether the extrajudicial statement was a
confession or an admission against interest.
Judge Anderson cited many authorities that have examined the differences
between confessions and admissions.58 His discussion of their definitions in Black's
Law Dictionary is particularly persuasive:
50. Id. at 615-16, 490 S.E.2d at 625-26.
51. Id. at 616, 490 S.E.2d at 625-26 (quoting id. at 595, 490 S.E.2d at 614).
52. Portman, 327 S.C. at 616, 490 S.E.2d at 625-26.
53. Id. at 616 n.1, 490 S.E.2d at 626 n.1 (Howell, C.J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 616, 490 S.E.2d at 626.
55. Id. at 606-10, 490 S.E.2d at 620-22 (Anderson, J., concurring in judgment).
56. Id. at 610, 490 S.E.2d at 622.
57. Id. at 606, 490 S.E.2d at 620.
58. Portman, 327 S.C. at 606-10, 490 S.E.2d at 620-22.
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Black's distinguishes a "confession" from an "admission": "A confession
is a statement admitting or acknowledging all facts necessary for
conviction of the crime. An admission, on the other hand, is an
acknowledgment of a fact or facts tending to prove guilt which falls short
of an acknowledgment of all essential elements of the crime."59
This distinction is not difficult to understand,' but its simplicity is deceptive.
Differentiating confessions and admissions is an easy task "on paper" or in the most
straight-forward cases. However, in more complex cases, drawing the line becomes
significantly more difficult. Ultimately, this determination may be as subjective as
deciding whether the State has established the corpus delicti without an
extrajudicial statement.
An examination of the Porman facts reveals this dilemma. Upon questioning
by the arresting officer at the scene of the accident, Portman replied, "'I was driving
the vehicle. I'm drunk, take me to jail."' 6 Judge Anderson determined that "the
statements emanating from Portman were quintessential'admissions' ratherthan'an
extrajudicial confession."'6 However, this conclusory assertion ignores the
complexity of the issue. Certainly, Portman's statement was not a confession in the
traditional sense. Portman never said, "I am guilty of driving under the influence of
alcohol." Additionally, Portman made his statements before being charged with
DUI. 63
Nevertheless, a plausible argument exists that Portman's statement was indeed
a confession. As Judge Anderson noted, South Carolina cases have restricted
confessions to acknowledgments of guilt;' Portman's statement arguably fits this
mold. The offense of DUI involves a person driving a vehicle under the influence
59. Id. at 607,490 S.E.2d at 621 (Anderson, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DicIoNARY 297 (6th ed. 1990)).
60. Suppose, for example, that a suspect arrested in connection with the shooting death of"Mr.
X' tells the police, "I'm the one you're looking for; I murdered X." This statement would obviously
be a confession. Yet, if the same suspect said only, "I was at the scene, and my gun was used to shoot
X," this statement would be an admission because the suspect would not necessarily be acknowledging
guilt.
61. Portman, 327 S.C. at 595, 490 S.E.2d at 614.
62. Id. at 614, 490 S.E.2d at 625 (Anderson, J., concurring in judgment).
63. Judge Anderson points outthatBlack'sLaw Dictionary"defines 'confession' as a 'voluntary
statement made by a person charged with the commission of a crime... wherein he acknowledges
himself to be guilty of the offense charged."' Id. at 607, 490 S.E.2d at 621 (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DIcIoNARY 296 (6th ed. 1990)) (emphasis added). Although this language suggests that a confession
can only be made after a person has been charged with a particular crime, the complete dictionary
definition never makes such a requirement. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 296-97 (6th ed. 1990).
Indeed, such a temporal requirement would mean that the murder suspect from the earlier hypothetical
could not confess to an unrelated robbery unless the suspect had also been charged with that offense.
See supra note 60.
64. Portman, 327 S.C. at 606, 490 S.E.2d at 620 (Anderson, J., concurring in judgment) (citing
State v. Cunningham, 275 S.C. 189,268 S.E.2d 289 (1980); State v. Miller, 211 S.C. 306, 45 S.E.2d
23 (1947); State v. Epes, 209 S.C. 246, 39 S.E.2d 769 (1946)),
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of drugs or alcohol within the State.6" By saying, "'I was driving the vehicle. I'm
drunk, take me to jail,"'" Portman essentially "confessed" to DUI: he admitted to
all of the elements of DUI,67 and he acknowledged his guilt when he told the officer
to take him to jail. However, Portman's statement may or may not have been a
confession. The argument that it might have been a confession reveals the difficulty
in employing the admissions exception. Reasonable minds could differ about
whether a statement was a confession or an admission as easily as they have
differed about whether the State has established the corpus delicti under the current
rule. Because the admissions exception would likely result in one judicial
conundrum replacing another, abandoning the current scheme in favor of the
admissions exception is difficult to justify.
Moreover, the admissions exception has neither strong nor wide-spread support
in other jurisdictions 8 or in South Carolina.69 A few scattered cases support the
admissions exception to the corpus delicti rule,7" but these cases do not form a
convincing argument for the exception. Indeed, some courts have expressly rejected
the notion that admissions and confessions should be treated differently in corpus
delicti situations.7' Arguing for the admissions exception, Judge Anderson relied
primarily on two Florida cases72 that discuss and apply the exception.73 Despite the
analysis in these two cases, they offer little support for the admissions exception
65. S.C. CODEANN. § 56-5-2930 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
66. Portman, 327 S.C. at 595, 490 S.E.2d at 614.
67. Discussing the South Carolina case law defining "confession," Judge Anderson cited State
v. Morgan, 282 S.C. 409, 319 S.E.2d 335 (1984). In Morgan the supreme court found that the
defendant's statement that he had been driving and had been using alcohol and marijuana was not a
confession to DUI because the defendant did not admitto being underthe influence. Id. at 411-12,319
S.E.2d at 336-37. Portman can be distinguished from Morgan, though, because Portman admitted to
being under the influence when he said, "I'm drunk." Portman, 327 S.C. at 595,490 S.E.2d at 614.
68. See, e.g., Stephens v. State, 898 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Ark. 1995) (holding corpus delicti rule
inapplicable to admissions against interest); Stowers v. State, 422 S.E.2d 870, 872 (Ga. 1992) (finding
no independent showing of corpus delicti was necessary to admit defendant's admission against
interest).
69. Judge Goolsby cited State v. Edwards, 173 S.C. 161,175 S.E. 277 (1934), for the proposition
that the corpus delicti rule does not bar admissions against interest. Portman, 327 S.C. at 595, 490
S.E.2d at 614-15. However, the language in Edwards is not as broad as the Portman court's citation
suggests, and the Edwards court appears to limit its holding directly to arson cases. Edwards, 173 S.C.
at 164, 175 S.E. at 278. Indeed, Judge Anderson did not even cite Edwards in his concurrence.
70. See cases cited supra note 68.
71. See, e.g., Fulmer v. State, 230 N.E.2d 307, 308 (Ind. 1967) (applying corpus delicti rule to
all extrajudicial statements); State v. McPhee, 115 A.2d 498, 501 (Me. 1955) (refusing to admit
confession or admission against interestuntil sufficient proofofcorpus delicti); Statev. Paris, 414 P.2d
512, 514 (N.M. 1966) ("It is clear that, unless the corpus delicti of the offense charged has been
otherwise established, a conviction cannot be sustained solely on extrajudicial confessions or
admissions of the accused.").
72. Burks v. State, 589 So. 2d 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 613 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1993)
(approving of result in court of appeals decision, but disapproving of its reasoning); Davis v. State, 582
So. 2d 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
73. Portman, 327 S.C. at 606-10, 490 S.E.2d at 620-22 (Anderson, J., concurring in judgment).
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because Florida no longer applies the exception. 4 The Florida Supreme Court,
while affirming the decision of the court of appeals inBurks, expressly disapproved
of its reasoning, stating that the distinction between confessions and admissions was
not dispositive in situations involving the application of the corpus delicti rule and
so the corroboration standard still applied.75 Judge Anderson relied on the Florida
District Court ofAppeal's decision inBurks even though the Florida Supreme Court
had expressly disapproved of the confession versus admission distinction the lower
appellate court had made. Since Burks, Florida has abandoned the admissions
exception to the corpus delicti rule. 6
Obviously, South Carolina need not base the adoption or rejection of its judicial
doctrines on the fate of those doctrines in other jurisdictions. However, the lack of
widespread support for the admissions exception and a low probability that it would
ease judicial decision-making caution South Carolina against the adoption of the
admissions exception to the corpus delicti rule.
IV. THE OSBORNE STRICT APPLICATION STANDARD
The strict application of the corpus delicti rule advocated by Chief Judge
Howell77 would unduly burden DUI prosecutions by limiting the instances in which
a defendant's extrajudicial statements could be admitted into evidence. Examining
the dissent's analysis of the Portman facts illustrates this point. The dissent implies
that Portman was a clear example of the State's failure to establish corpus delicti.8
In reaching this conclusion, the dissent focused on two crucial facts: (1) Portman
was not alone at the scene; and (2) Portman was not the vehicle's registered
owner.79 The dissent argued that these facts made it "just as likely, if not more
likely, that the registered owner of the car" was driving."
Although these facts suggest that the registered owner might have been the
driver, Portman, not the registered owner, admitted he was driving the car.8 ' The
dissent argues that no evidence indicated that anyone else at the scene was
intoxicated. 2 However, had the registered owner been sober, she quite possibly
74. See J.B. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1376, 1378 (Fla. 1998) ("[V]e reaffirm the requirement that an
independent corpus delicti must be established when offering an admission against interest into
evidence."); R.L.B. v. State, 703 So. 2d 1245, 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ("Under the corpus
delicti rule, the state has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, that a crime was committed,
as a prerequisite to offering in evidence an admission against interest.").
75. Burks v. State, 613 So. 2d 441, 443-44 (Fla. 1993).
76. See cases cited supra note 74.
77. Portman, 327 S.C. at 614-16, 490 S.E.2d at 625-26 (Howell, C.J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 614, 490 S.E.2d at 625 ("If the requirement that the State must establish the corpus
delicti in a DUI case has any meaning at all, then this case should be reversed.").
79. Id. at 615, 490 S.E.2d at 625.
80. Id. at 615-16, 490 S.E.2d at 625.
81. Id. at 595, 490 S.E.2d at 614 (Goolsby, J.).
82. Id. at 615, 490 S.E.2d at 625 (Howell, C.L, dissenting).
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would have claimed to have driven the car. Following this line of reasoning, if the
registered owner was intoxicated and either she or Portman were operating the car,
then someone clearly was operating a vehicle while under the influence. 3 Thus,
Portman presents a situation in which a DUI offense most likely occurred. Yet,
under the strict application standard as applied in Osborne, the court would not have
admitted any extrajudicial statements and would not have convicted the defendant.
As this discussion of the Portman facts demonstrates, the strict application
standard would hamper DUI prosecutions by preventing judges from basing
reasonable inferences on the totality of circumstances presented by the State in its
proof of corpus delicti. Although the corpus delicti rule is designed to protect
defendants, 4 rejecting a strict application standard does not unduly threaten this
protection because even the mere formality approach will bar the admission of an
extrajudicial statement when no evidence of a crime exists.85 As a result, refusing
to strictly apply the corpus delicti rule presents only a de minimis intrusion into the
protection offered by the rule; in contrast, the State has a significant interest in
obtaining DUI convictions. Consequently, South Carolina should not strictly apply
the corpus delicti rule.
V. THE MERE FORMALITY STANDARD
Portman, in effect, returns South Carolina DUI law to its pre-Osborne status
by retreating from the latter case's strict application of the corpus delicti rule and
reaffirming the mere formality standard. In so doing, South Carolina's DUI law falls
back in line with that of otherjurisdictions.86 This weight of authority, coupled with
a public policy concern for effective enforcement of DUI laws, strongly suggests
that South Carolina should continue to apply the standard used by Judge Goolsby
in Portman.
A. South Carolina Case Law Supports the Mere Formality Standard
An examination of South Carolina case law reveals that most courts have used
the lenient mere formality standard to which Portman returns." Typically, courts
83. See State v. Smith, 328 S.C. 622, 625, 493 S.E.2d 506, 508 (Ct. App. 1997) ("[T]o sustain
a DUI conviction, there must be evidence other than the defendant's extrajudicial statements that
someone (but not necessarily the defendant) was driving while impaired.").
84. The corpus delicti rule protects defendants from conviction based upon a confession to a
crime that was never committed. Portman, 327 S.C. at 602-03, 490 S.E.2d at 618 (Anderson, J.,
concurring in judgment).
85. For example, not even the most conservative court would uphold a conviction based upon an
individual simply wandering into a police station and confessing to driving under the influence when
the police fail to locate a car or anyone that could corroborate the individual's statement.
86. See cases cited supra note 10.
87. See State v. Morgan, 282 S.C. 409, 319 S.E.2d 335 (1984); State v. Townsend, 321 S.C. 55,
467 S.E.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. White, 311 S.C. 289, 428 S.E.2d 740 (Ct. App. 1993).
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have upheld DUI convictions that have been challenged on corpus delicti grounds,
and the courts' applications of the underlying corpus delicti rule have been less than
strenuous."8 The basic corpus delicti rule is well established,89 and courts have
generally professed to follow it. However, courts have usually experienced little
difficulty in finding the State's evidence sufficient to prove the corpus delicti, often
issuing a simple conclusory statement to that effect.' Portman fits into this pattern.
Indeed, as illustrated by a brief overview of these decisions, it is Osborne, as
distinguished in Portman, that departs from precedent.
In State v. Townsend,9' decided shortly before Osborne, the court of appeals
found that the State had produced adequate evidence of the corpus delicti.' The
State relied on the following facts to establish the corpus delicti: the police
discovered the defendant at the scene of a one-car accident; the defendant smelled
of alcohol, failed field sobriety tests, and had a blood alcohol level of 0.21; and
firefighters at the scene indicated that the defendant had been driving the vehicle.93
Although the court found that this circumstantial evidence was strong enough to
send the case to the jury,94 it gave little discussion to support the conclusory
observation that the corpus delicti had been established."
In State v. Gilliam96 the defendant was found alone inside an automobile at the
scene of a single car accident.97 An open bottle of alcohol was also discovered in
the vehicle.98 A tow truck operator, arriving at the scene shortly after the wreck
occurred, testified that he-smelled alcohol on the defendant and that the defendant
appeared to be drunk." At the hospital, the defendant "rambled" when he tried to
speak."ce The court found this evidence sufficient to send the case to the jury.
1'0
88. See, e.g., Smith, 328 S.C. at 623-26, 493 S.E.2d 507-09 (establishing corpus delicti when
defendant was found intoxicated at the scene, but was not alone and was not in the driver's seat of the
vehicle); Townsend, 321 S.C. at 57-58, 467 S.E.2d at 140-41 (establishing corpus delicti when
defendant was found intoxicated at the scene, but was standing some distance away from the vehicle).
89. See Portman, 327 S.C. at 602, 490 S.E.2d at 618 (Anderson, J., concurring in judgment)
(citing Carolyn K. MacWilliam, Annotation, Sufficiency of Corroboration of Confession for Purpose
ofEstablishing Corpus Delicti as Question of Law or Fact, 33 A.L.R.5th 571 (1995)).
90. See, e.g., Smith, 328 S.C. at 626, 493 S.E.2d at 509 ("ITihe State presented sufficient
evidence other than [Defendant's] own statements establishing the corpus delicti of the crime of
DUI."); Townsend, 321 S.C. at 58, 467 S.E.2d at 140 ("This is enough evidence, albeit circumstantial
evidence, to submit the case to the jury.").
91. 321 S.C. 55,467 S.E.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1996).
92. Id. at 57-58, 467 S.E.2d at 140-41.
93. Id. at 57-5 8, 467 S.E.2d at 140.
94. Id. at 58, 467 S.E.2d at 140.
95. See id. at 57-59, 467 S.E.2d at 140-41.
96. 270 S.C. 345, 242 S.E.2d 410 (1978).




101. Id. Gilliam seems to represent the "ideal" case for prosecutors facing a corpus delicti
challenge because the defendant was alone at the scene of the accident when he was discovered. Even
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In State v. Smith, 2 the most recent South Carolina case that considers this
issue, the court of appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction over a corpus delicti
rule challenge.0 3 The essential facts included the following: (1) the defendant's car
left the road and landed in a ditch; (2) the police chief arrived and saw the defendant
leaning on his car; (3) the defendant smelled of alcohol and failed field sobriety
tests; and (4) the two other people present at the scene both identified the defendant
as the driver." 4 Ironically, Chief Judge Howell, writing for a unanimous court, held
that the State's evidence established the corpus delicti ofthe crime ofDUI 05 Thus,
Smith suggests that the court of appeals continues to follow Portman's more lenient
corpus delicti standard in DUI cases.
As Townsend, Gilliam, and Smith illustrate, Osborne was the departure from
prior South Carolinajurisprudenceto whichPortman returned. The Osborne court's
departure from a traditional approach to DUI cases was not radical. However,
Osborne did strictly evaluate the State's corpus delicti proof. Under the facts of that
case, the more stringent approach was justified. In Osborne the police did not
discover the defendant at the scene, 6 and the State's evidence was insufficient to
establish that the accident resulted from drunk driving. 7 Although the facts in
Osborne might allow a fact-finder to speculate that a DUI offense had occurred,
speculation about facts not in existence is impermissible." 8 The court's reasoning
is sound; and consequently, labeling Osborne a "bad" decision is difficult, even
though it appeared to "raise the bar" for the State's requisite showing of corpus
delicti.
Thus, the Portman court did not need to repudiate Osborne; the court merely
needed to limit its scope. By distinguishing Osborne, Portman limits a more strict
application of the corpus delicti rule in DUI cases to Osborne's particular facts (i.e.,
defendant not found at the scene, no evidence of impaired driving). In Portman the
court essentially announced that Osborne did not spell the end of South Carolina's
mere formality standard for the corpus delicti rule in DUI cases. Rather, Osborne
simply created a limited exception to this leniency. 9
Chief Judge Howell in his Portman dissent conceded, "Had Portman been the only person at the scene,
... the case might properly have been submitted to the jury." City of Easley v Portman, 327 S.C. 593,
616, 490 S.E.2d at 613, 626 (Ct. App. 1997) (Howell, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, the presence of other
people at the scene in Portman appears to be very troublesome for Chief Judge Howell. He observed
that "the circumstantial evidence makes it just as likely, if not more likely, that the registered owner
of the car, who was present at the scene, was driving the car at the time of the accident." Id. at 615-16,
490 S.E.2d at 625.
102. 328 S.C. 622, 493 S.E.2d 506 (Ct. App. 1997).
103. Id. at 624-25, 493 S.E.2d at 508.
104. Id. at 623-24, 493 S.E.2d at 507-08.
105. Id. at 626, 493 S.E.2d at 509.
106. State v. Osborne, 321 S.C. 196, 198, 467 S.E.2d 454, 455 (Ct. App. 1996).
107. Id. at 200-01, 467 S.E.2d at 457.
108. Id. at 201, 467 S.E.2d at 457.
109. The South Carolina Supreme Court may soon decide whether the lenient standard reaffirmed
in Portman and followed in Smith will remain viable. On April 2, 1997, the supreme court granted
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B. Other Jurisdictions
Because Portman limits Osborne, South Carolina's application of the corpus
delicti rule to DUI cases remains in accord with the law of most other
jurisdictions."' Indeed, establishing the corpus delicti of DUI so that a defendant's
extrajudicial statement may be admitted does not seem to be a difficult task,
regardless ofthejurisdiction. The cases demonstrating this nationwide trend are too
numerous to discuss in any significant detail in this Note; however, a few of the
cases, with facts similar to those in Portman, merit a brief examination.
The Portman court cited State v. Douglas.' and State v. Stimmel12 as cases
with "very similar fact patterns [that] support [the court's] holding."'" 3 In Douglas
the arresting officer discovered the defendant at the scene of a one-car accident."4
The defendant was intoxicated and admitted that he had been driving the car."'
Although several other people were also at the scene and nothing other than the
defendant's statements identified him as the driver, the court concluded that the
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti and so the case,
including the defendant's statements, was properly sent to the jury." 6
In Stimmel the arresting officer found the defendant standing next to a vehicle
at the scene of a one-car accident."' The defendant exhibited signs of intoxication
and admitted to driving the car." 8 Two other men were at the scene, but they left in
their own vehicles shortly after the officer arrived." 9 The court found the corpus
delicti sufficiently established and upheld the defendant's conviction for DUI. 2"
Thus, New Hampshire and Missouri' 2' share South Carolina's approach to the
corpus delicti rule in DUI cases.
As these cases illustrate, South Carolina's lenient standard is not unique.
certiorari to decide State v. Osborne, 321 S.C. 196, 467 S.E.2d 454 (Ct. App. 1996). At publication,
the supreme court has yet to decide the case.
110. See cases cited supra note 10.
111. 162 A.2d 159 (N.H. 1960).
112. 800 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. CL App. 1990).
113. City of Easley v. Portman, 327 S.C. 593, 597-98 n.1, 490 S.E.2d 613, 616 n.1 (Ct. App.
1997).
114. Douglas, 162 A.2d at 159.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 159-60.
117. Stimmel, 800 S.W.2d at 157.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 159.
121. For a brief, but interesting, examination of the status of admissions and the corpus delicti
rule in Missouri DWI cases, see Sandy Craig, Comment, DWILaw in Missouri, 52 Mo. L. REV. 867,
873-76 (1987). Craig reveals that Missouri courts do not require proof of the defendant's connection
with the DWI offense as an element of the corpus delicti. Id. at 874. According to Craig, Missouri
courts require only that a DWI defendant's extrajudicial statements be corroborated by direct or
circumstantial evidence before they may be admitted into evidence, and "the courts are not particularly
strict in this area." Id. at 875.
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Indeed, this state's application of the corpus delicti rule appears to be in line with
that of other states."z As Judge Anderson explained in Portman, "In light of the
plethora of procedural protections granted defendants in modem criminal practice,
the corpus delicti rule is supported by few practical or social policy considerations.
Therefore, the rule of corpus delicti should be applied with circumspection."'"
Clearly the Portman decision and the decisions of other jurisdictions follow this
reasoning.'24
C. The Mere Formality Standard Allows for the Effective Administration of
Justice
Obviously, single car DUI accident cases create special prosecutorial problems
because proving that a defendant was driving the car without the defendant's
admission may be impossible. A strict application of the corpus delicti rule
compounds the State's problems because such an interpretation excludes these
statements if no independent corroboration of DUI exists. Thus, because the State
might not be able to place a defendant behind the wheel beyond a reasonable doubt
without the defendant's extrajudicial statements, a strict judicial application of the
rule would likely result in fewer DUI convictions. Clearly, the public's desire for
tougher enforcement of DUI laws makes this result intolerable.
The mere formality standard addresses this concem, but it does so without
sacrificing the protections of the underlying rule.'25 Under the mere formality
standard, courts still require the State to produce some evidence of the corpus delicti
before the State can admit an extrajudicial statement.'26 However, courts are lenient
in deciding when the State has met this threshold.27 Courts can still refuse to admit
confessions when clearly no DUI offense was committed,'28 but defendants will not
122. See cases cited supra note 10; see also Commonwealth v. Manning, 668 N.E.2d 850 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1996) (establishing corpus delicti when police found the defendant intoxicated at the scene
of a single car accident, even though others were with the defendant at the scene); Turner v. State, 877
S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (establishing corpus delicti when police found the defendant alone
at the scene of single-car accident, the defendant was intoxicated, skid marks suggested that the
accident was caused by impaired driving, and the defendant made an extrajudicial admission).
123. City of Easley v. Portman, 327 S.C. 593, 613, 490 S.E.2d 613, 624 (Ct. App. 1997)
(Anderson, J., concurring in judgment).
124. Of course, no matter how widespread this lenient approach becomes, some facts are simply
insufficient to establish the corpus delicti. See, e.g., State v. Friesen, 725 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) (finding that the corpus delicti was not established when police discovered two people at the
scene of an accident and the only evidence that one or the other was the driver consisted of the vehicle
being registered to the defendant and the defendant's extrajudicial statements).
125. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
126. Portman, 327 S.C. at 595, 490 S.E.2d at 614.
127. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 328 S.C. 622, 624-25, 493 S.E.2d 506, 508-09 (Ct. App. 1997)
(finding defendant intoxicated at scene, but not in driver's seat of vehicle); State v. Townsend, 321 S.C.
55, 57-58, 467 S.E.2d 138, 140-41 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding defendant intoxicated at scene, but some
distance away from the vehicle).
128. Cf. supra note 60 (illustrating by hypothetical the distinction between an admission and a
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be able to use the rule as a "technicality" with which to avoid conviction.
Some states have merely modified the corpus delicti rule," 9 and other states
have essentially abandoned the corpus delicti rule altogether and replaced it with
a so-called "trustworthiness rule."'30 Under this standard, the prosecution must
produce "independent proof of facts and circumstances which strengthen or bolster
the confession and tend to generate a belief in its trustworthiness.'' This rule has
a common sense appeal, and perhaps South Carolina will one day expressly
renounce the corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness rule. At present,
however, South Carolina need not adopt the trustworthiness test for DUI cases
because the mere formality standard achieves essentially the same result. Although
nominally still cast in terms of corpus delicti and the elements of the offense, South
Carolina's corroboration inquiry in DUI cases attempts to answerthe same question
as the trustworthiness test: Does some credible evidence exist that supports the
defendant's confession? An affirmative answer to this question allows the State to
build its case on the extrajudicial statement without concern that the defendant has,
for some reason, confessed to a crime that never occurred-the very situation the
corpus delicti rule was designed to prevent.
VI. CONCLUSION
By returning to the mere formality standard, the Portman court chose the most
appropriate application of the corpus delicti rule in DUI cases. Portman's retreat
from the strict application standard of Osborne is in harmony with prior South
Carolina case law. Furthermore, South Carolina's corpus delicti rule is now once
again in line with the majority ofjurisdictions, reflecting society's desire to enforce
DUI laws rigorously. However, this judicial viewpoint does not unduly burden DUI
defendants, and it still allows the corpus delicti rule to serve its intended function. 32
Thus, the mere formality standard balances the competing interests in DUI cases
more effectively than the Osborne strict application standard, which unnecessarily
hampers DUI prosecutions.
confession).
129. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 337 S.E.2d 487, 494 (N.C. 1985) (asserting that a strict rule is no
longer useful because it focuses on the elements of the crime rather than the reliability of the
confession).
130. See, e.g., State v. Yoshida, 354 P.2d 986, 990 (Haw. 1960) (finding statements admissible
if trustworthiness of confession is bolstered by State's other evidence); State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50,
60 (N.J. 1959) (opining that extrinsic proof to corroborate an extrajudicial statement is sufficient if the
proof creates a belief in the trustworthiness of the statement).
131. Lucas, 152 A.2d at 60.
132. As Judge Anderson wrote in his concurring opinion, "The requirement that the corpus delicti
be sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence is rooted in the premise that the examination of
this additional evidence will avert the danger that a crime was confessed when in fact no such crime
was committed." City of Easley v. Portman, 327 S.C. 593, 602-03, 490 S.E.2d 613, 618 (Ct. App.
1997) (Anderson, J., concurring in judgment).
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Judge Anderson's argument in favor of an admissions exception adds another
interesting dimension to Porman because the exception is enticing at first glance.
However, a closer examination reveals that the exception does not necessarily offer
a fool-proof solution to the problem of extrajudicial statements. Moreover, the
exception lacks the widespread support enjoyed by the mere formality approach to
the corpus delicti rule. For these reasons, South Carolina should not adopt this
exception. When the South Carolina Supreme Court decides Osborne, it should
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DUTY TO WARN AND PUBLIC NOTIFICATION OF
THE RELEASE OF SEX OFFENDERS
I. INTRODUCTION
The creation of a duty to warn of the release or presence in a community of a
sex offender may have widespread social and legal ramifications. This Note
describes and analyzes the relationship between the state's common-law duty to
warn the public of the dangerous propensities of certain individuals and the South
Carolina sex offender registration and notice requirements imposed by the Sex
Offender Registry.' Because the sex offender registration law might impose a duty
to warn the general public or a specified individual, this Note will first discuss the
common-law duty to warn specific individuals ofthe dangerous propensities of third
persons. The Note will then review the presence or absence of common-law duties
in this area. Finally, the Note will explain and compare federal and South Carolina
sex offender registration and notice requirements.
II. THE COMMON LAW: WARNING SPECIFIED INDIVIDUALS
Establishing liability in negligence actions requires a duty to act or to refrain
from acting.2 Without an affirmative legal duty, courts often dismiss cases on
summary judgment. Warnings of the dangerous propensities of others, whether to
foreseeable individuals or to the general public, are rarely legally required. As the
South Carolina Court of Appeals summarized:
Ordinarily, the common law imposes no duty on a person to act. An
affirmative legal duty exists only if created by statute, contract,
relationship, status, property interest, or some other special circumstance.
It follows that a person usually incurs no liability for failure to take steps
to benefit others or to protect them from harm not created by his own
wrongful act.3
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-400 to -490 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
2. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 282 cmt. a (1965) (defining negligence); F.
PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORT 37-39 (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing duty and breach of duty).
3. Rayfield v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 297 S.C. 95, 100, 374 S.E.2d 910, 913 (Ct.
App. 1988); accordSharpe v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health, 292 S.C. 11, 18,354 S.E.2d 778,
782 (CL App. 1987) (Bell, J., concurring) (refusing to impose on a physician a general duty to warn
of a patient's potential danger to the public). In Sharpe Judge Bell acknowledged that unlike South
Carolina, some states, particularly California, recognize the existence of a duty to warn third persons
when a danger exists as to a specific person based on a therapist-patient relationship. Id. at 18-19, 354
S.E.2d at 782 (citing Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)).
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Generally, a common-law duty to warn exists only under circumstances that create
affirmative legal duties.
In Rogers v. South Carolina Department of Parole and Community
Corrections4 the South Carolina Supreme Court decided whether a duty exists to
notify past and potential victims of a convicted offender's pending release. In
Rogers the court affirmed a trial court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendant because no duty to warn arises without "a specific threat of harm directed
at a specific individual.".. "[W]hen a defendant has the ability to monitor, supervise,
and control an individual's conduct, a special relationship exists between the
defendant and the individual, and the defendant may have a common law duty to
warn potential victims of the individual's dangerous conduct."6 The court applied
this rule to the release of a convicted burglar on furlough who subsequently killed
a woman. Even though the released convict had burglarized the woman's house
three times,7 the court found no affirmative duty to warn because the convict made
no specific threat against the victim during his incarceration.8 The court thus
confirmed the absence of a general duty to warn of the dangerous propensities of
others without knowledge of a specific threat of harm to the potential victim.9
Justice Jean H. Toal wrote a scathing dissent in Rogers. She concurred with the
majority that a common-law duty to warn potential victims with a special
relationship is created by virtue of two factors: (1) the defendant's ability to
monitor, supervise, or control the individual; and (2)the defendant's knowledge that
the perpetrator posed a threat to a specific victim." However, she stated that
something less than a specific, verbalized, or written threat should give the
defendant sufficient knowledge that the individual poses an identifiable threat to a
particular individual." Justice Toal would hold that a duty to warn exists "when the
individual has made a specific threat of harm directed at the potential victim or
when the individual's conduct indicates an intent to harm the potential victim."' 2 If
the majority had adopted that argument, the result would have been very different
because the convict had admitted burglarizing the victim three times previously and
law enforcement personnel were aware he lived less than five hundred yards from
the victim. 3 Justice Toal considered this conduct sufficient to indicate an intent to
4. 320 S.C. 253, 464 S.E.2d 330 (1995).
5. Id. at 256, 464 S.E.2d at 332 (citing Sheerin v. State, 434 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 1989)).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 257, 464 S.E.2d at 333 (Toal, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 256, 464 S.E.2d at 332.
9. Id.
10. Rogers, 320 S.C. at 257, 464 S.E.2d at 332 (Toal, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 257, 464 S.E.2d at 333.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 257-58, 464 S.E.2d at 333. Under the Victim's and Witness's Bill of Rights, S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-3-1510 to -1560 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1996) (amended 1997), a victim or witness
had the right to be notified when the convicted offender received any release from custody or when the
offender escaped from custody. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(C)(7) (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1996)
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harm the victim once again. 4
Two relatively recent cases decided by the court of appeals have cemented
South Carolina's jurisprudence in this area. In Bishop v. South Carolina
Department ofMental Health" the court reaffirmed the absence of a common-law
duty to warn of the dangerous propensities of others. 6 In Bishop the plaintiff
obtained involuntary commitment of her adult daughter, Tammie. 7 Tammie had
allegedly been reading about Satanic rituals, including child sacrifice, and had
threatened to harm her minor child, of whom the plaintiff was legal guardian. 8
After Tammie's release, the plaintiff allowed Tammie to be alone with the child and
later noticed some ink markings on the child's arms and body, including the
abdominal and vaginal area. 9 Although no medical evidence of injury was found,
the plaintiff sought to hold the Department of Mental Health liable for failing to
warn her of potential harm to the child.2° Applying the Rogers standard, the court
of appeals concluded that the Department had no duty to wam the plaintiff2 ' about
Tammie's release because Tammie made no specific threat of harm to the child
while in the Department's custody.'
In Gilmer v. Martin' a doctor's patient killed a nursing home resident while the
patient was employed as a nurse's aide at the nursing home.24 The victim's family
sued the doctor for failing to warn the nursing home of his patient's mental
problems.' However, while in the care of the doctor, the patient never made any
specific threat directed at any individual other than herself.26 Accordingly, the court
refused to recognize the existence of a duty to warn all foreseeable victims.27
Many states, including South Carolina, generally follow the Second
Restatement of Torts, which directly addresses the existence of an affirmative duty
(repealed 1997). The statute in effect when the convict in Rogers was released from custody in 1985
did not require notification. See Act of June 13, 1983, No. 96, 1983 S.C. Acts 199, 200-01. In 1997
the South Carolina State Constitution was amended to include notification requirements. See S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(2); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-1505 to -1565 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997)
(implementing the constitutional provision).
14. Rogers, 320 S.C. at 258, 464 S.E.2d at 333 (Toal, J., dissenting).
15. 323 S.C. 158, 473 S.E.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1996).
16. Id. at 161,473 S.E.2d at 816.
17. Id. at 160, 473 S.E.2d at 815.
18. Id. at 161, 473 S.E.2d at 816.
19. Id. at 160, 473 S.E.2d at 815.
20. Id. at 159, 473 S.E.2d at 815.
21. The court noted that the plaintiff was well aware of Tammie's threats concerning the minor
childbecause the threats were the reason the plaintiffsoughtTammie's commitment. Moreover, despite
her concerns, the plaintiff allowed Tammie to remove the child from her supervision after Tammie's
release. Bishop, 323 S.C. at 162, 473 S.E.2d at 816.
22. Id.
23. 323 S.C. 154,473 S.E.2d 812 (Ct. App. 1996).
24. Id. at 156, 473 S.E.2d at 813.
25. Id. at 157, 473 S.E.2d at 813.
26. Id. at 156, 473 S.E.2d at 813.
27. Id. at 157-58, 473 S.E.2d at 814.
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to control or warn of the dangerous propensities of others." For example, North
Carolina, Virginia, and Alabama require no general duty to warn or prevent harm
to another based on mere conduct of a third person.29 As a result, a duty to warn is
infrequently imposed. However, knowledge of a person's propensity for violence
and specific threats to an identifiable victim may reach the level of foreseeability
necessary to impose a duty to warn or control conduct.30 Otherwise, unforeseeability
and general policy considerations against liability for the actions of third parties
limit the duty to warn.3 Even the celebrated Tarasoffv. Regents of University of
California2 holding has since been narrowed to a duty to warn only when a specific
victim is identified. 33 In comparison, Alaska has held that "[a] victim may be
'foreseeable' without being specifically identifiable." '34 However, no such rule exists
in South Carolina.
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315, 319 (1965). Section 315 states that
[tihere is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to
the other a right to protection.
Id. § 315. Section 319 states that "[o]ne who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should
know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm." Id. § 319.
29. See Morton v. Prescott, 564 So. 2d 913, 915 (Ala. 1990) ("Absent special relationships or
circumstances, a person has no duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third person.");
Donahoo v. State, 479 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Ala. 1985) (finding no duty to warn or protect unless the
parole agency or officers knew or should have known that the aggressor might be a danger to a specific
person); Hedrick v. Rains, 466 S.E.2d 281, 283-84 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (finding no duty to prevent
harm by a third person unless the defendant has a special relationship with the plaintiff and knows of
the person's propensity for violence); Nasser v. Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502, 506 (Va. 1995) (holding that
a psychiatrist/patient relationship involved an insufficient level of "take charge" or control within the
meaning of sections 315(a) and 319 in the Second Restatement of Torts); Fox v. Custis, 372 S.E.2d
373, 376 (Va. 1988) (holding that the requisite degree of control in the parolee/parole officer
relationship did not justify a duty to warn).
30. See Rogers v. South Carolina Dep't of Parole & Community Corrections, 320 S.C. 253,256,
464 S.E.2d 330, 332 (1995); Gilmer, 323 S.C. at 157, 473 S.E.2d at 814.
31. See, e.g., Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 735 (Cal. 1980) (declining to
impose blanket liability for failing to warn based on public policy and foreseeability). But see Tarasoff
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976) ("[O]nce a therapist... determine[s]
... that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger.").
32. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)
33. Thompson, 614 P.2d at 736.
34. Division of Corrections, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121, 1129
(Alaska 1986). The Alaska Supreme Court found a special relationship between a parolee and a parole
officer. Id. at 1126. The courtheld that the victims were within a "zone of foreseeable hazards" because
they were residents of an isolated community of approximately 100 people. As a result, the Parole
Board could be held to owe a duty to warn of the release of a parolee. Id. at 1129.
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III. THE COMMON LAW: WARNING THE GENERAL UNIDENTIFIED PUBLIC
Parties in South Carolina have rarely advanced the argument that a general
public warning should be issued on the release of convicted offenders or mental
patients because the supreme court has imposed a duty to warn a potential victim
only in the presence of a specified, express threat of harm to that individual. In
Sharpe v. South Carolina Department of Mental Health35 the court of appeals
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the court should issue a public warning when
a mental patient is released.36 In an interesting concurring opinion, Judge Randall
Bell explored the practical and policy issues involved in requiring a duty to warn
the general public of the release of mental patients.37 He concluded that the
dissemination and issuance of warnings is inherently problematic. For example, "it
would create new grounds for legal liability based on the content of the warnings.' 38
Moreover, because warnings must be meaningful, hospitals and doctors may
overwarn and thus dilute the effect of a warning simply to protect themselves from
liability.39
Judge Bell listed a number of significant policy reasons against requiring public
warnings of the release of potentially unstable patients:
[lit would intrude on the patient's privacy; it would often be therapeutically
counterproductive; it would publicly stigmatize mental patients and most
probably deter them from seeking treatment; it would undermine the policy
favoring voluntary rather than involuntary treatment for mental disorders;
it would undermine the policy favoring release and reintegration of mental
patients into the community; and rather than making the law more simple
and more certain, it would create a maze of complex legal questions where
none presently exists.4"
Judge Bell metaphorically related such a public warning to "cry[ing] 'Wolf."' 4' He
added that such a "Big Brother" approach "would have no meaningful effect on
public awareness or safety."'42 Such policy reasons weigh heavily against imposing
a duty to warn the general public and probably have a role in limiting the duty to
warn specific individuals.
35. 292 S.C. 11,354 S.E.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1987).
36. Id. at 15, 354 S.E.2d at 780.
37. Id. at 19-20, 354 S.E.2d at 783 (Bell, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 20, 354 S.E.2d at 783.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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IV. AN INTRODUCTION TO SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION
LEGISLATION
43
Increasing concern over the recidivism rates of sex offenders44 has led many
citizens to ask their lawmakers to better protect and inform them when convicted
offenders are released from custody and re-enter society.4 The resulting legislation
has taken numerous forms. A growing number of states allow for public
dissemination of the offender's presence in the community,46 and some require
public notification of a sex offender's presence, identity, and address within the
community.47
In 1996 the South Carolina General Assembly substantially amended48 the Sex
Offender Registry.49 South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) operates
the Sex Offender Registry,"0 which is similar to legislation in many other states.5'
These amendments were enacted to keep track of convicted sex offenders after their
release from custody and to enable law enforcement to protect the public and guard
against repeat offenses. 2 Moreover, the 1996 South Carolina amendments changed
the statute to allow public inspection of information collected for the registry and
notification of the release of convicted sex offenders. 3
43. This Note is not a comparative survey ofthe various sex offender registration statutes enacted
by state legislatures. For such a comparison, see Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender
Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with
the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 788 (1996).
44. See, e.g., Thousands Mourn Death, Rally for "Megan's Law, "THE REc. (N. N.J.), Aug. 3,
1994, at A3 ("The [victim's] family is calling for legislation.., that would require neighborhood
notification when sex offenders move to a community.").
45. See Earl-Hubbard, supra note 43, at 794-96 (describing the origins of state and federal
registration schemes).
46. See, e.g., Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3825(C) (West Supp. 1997) ("[Ihe local law
enforcement agency shall notify the community of the offender's presence in the community pursuant
to the guidelines established by the community notification guidelines committee."); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 290.4 (West Supp. 1998) (authorizing operation of a "900" telephone number for the public to call
and inquire whether a specific individual is on the sex offender list); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4909 (1995)
(requiring sex offender information be open to public inspection).
47. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.ANN 152/120 (West 1997) (requiring this information be open
to public inspection); N.Y. CoRREcT. LAW § 168-I (McKinney Supp. 1997-98) (permitting law
enforcement dissemination of such information).
48. Act of June 18, 1996, No. 444, 1996 S.C. Acts 2673.
49. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 23-3-400 to -490 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
50. S.C. CODEANN. § 23-3-410 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
51. Compare, e.g., S.C. CODEANN. §§ 23-3-400 to -490 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (establishing
registration and notification requirements), with GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (1997) (allowing
discretionary notification).
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-400 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-490 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
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V. THE SOUTH CAROLINA SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY
Sex offender registration is intended to provide law enforcement officials with
information about convicted sex offenders. 4 Although the Sex Offender Registry
promotes the "public health, welfare, and safety of [the state's] citizens,"55 the
registration "provisions are not intended to violate the guaranteed constitutional
rights of those who have violated our nation's laws" and served their sentence. 6
The Sex Offender Registry requires registration for a wide range of criminal
activity." The emphasis on sexual offenses involving children reveals the General
Assembly's strong interest in protecting the welfare and safety of children.
Convicted sex offenders must register for life and update their registration
annually.58 Any time the offender moves within the state, the offender must contact
the county sheriff with new registration information.59
Either the Department of Corrections or the Department of Probation, Parole,
and Pardon Services must notify SLED and the county sheriff when an offender will
be released or placed on probation.6' The Department of Corrections must also
instruct the offender orally and in writing to register with the local sheriff within
twenty-four hours of release.6 The releasing department shall also provide SLED
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-400 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Under the Act, a resident, regardless of age, is considered a sex offender for registration
purposes if the person has been convicted in any recognized federal or state court in the United States
of any of the following offenses:
(1) criminal sexual conduct in the first degree;
(2) criminal sexual conduct in the second degree;
(3) criminal sexual conduct in the third degree;
(4) criminal sexual conduct with minors, first degree;
(5) criminal sexual conduct with minors, second degree...;
(6) engaging a child for sexual performance;
(7) producing, directing, or promoting sexual performance by a child;
(8) criminal sexual conduct: assaults with intent to commit;
(9) incest;
(10) buggery;
(11) committing or attempting lewd act upon child under fourteen;
(12) eavesdropping or peeping; [and]
(13) [felony violations under Obscenity, Material Harmful to Minors, Child
Exploitation, and Child Prostitution]
S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (citations omitted). The felonies under
subsection (13) above include those listed in S.C. CODEANN. §§ 16-15-305 to -445 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1997).
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-460 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). A few other states require lifetime
registration. For example, Alaska requires multiple offenders to register for life, ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.63.020 (Michie 1996), and Washington requires lifetime registration for those offenders convicted
of a Class A felony. WASH. REv. CoDEANN. § 9A.44.140(1)(a) (West Supp. 1998).
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-460 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-440 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
61. Id. § 23-3-440(1).
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with the offender's current address, descriptive information, and a current
photograph to aid in locating offenders if they fail to register.62
The original Sex Offender Registry provided that "[i]nformation collected for
the offender registry shall not be open to inspection by the public."63 This
confidentiality requirement disregarded the public's desire to know about and
protect themselves from persons with potentially dangerous propensities. As a
result, the General Assembly amended the Sex Offender Registry in 1996. Most
significantly, the information in the Registry is now available to the general
public.65 Upon written request, the sheriff must now release the offender's full
name, aliases, date of birth, current home address, offense that required the
registration, date and location of conviction, and a photocopy of a current
photograph.6 However, the sheriff is prohibited from releasing this information to
anyone other than the person making the request. 7
Because the individual citizen is required to act affirmatively, the new law may
not appear to mandate extensive public disclosure. However, the amendment also
states that the Sex Offender Registry does not prohibit "a sheriff from disseminating
information... if the sheriff or another law enforcement officer is presented with
facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and has reason to
believe the release of this information will deter the criminal activity."63 This
language gives a county sheriff discretion to publicly disseminate the information
and warn the public under certain circumstances. Although the legislation does not
extend so far as to require public notification, it does not restrict those who may
receive the information.69 Notwithstanding the individual request provision, the
discretionary dissemination amendment may ultimately result in widespread public
notification.
The statute provides little guidance about the parameters of a South Carolina
sheriffs discretionary authority to disseminate or distribute the information
contained within the registry.7" Some states have attempted to define precise
notification conditions.7' For example, unlike South Carolina's amendments, New
Jersey's classification and notification provisions provide law enforcement
62. Id. § 23-3-440(4).
63. Act of July 1, 1994, No. 497, § 112, 1994 S.C. Acts 5129, 5798.
64. See Act of June 18, 1996, No. 444, 1996 S.C. Acts 2673, 2684-90 (codified as amended at
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-400 to -490 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997)).
65. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-490 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
66. Id. § 23-3-490(A).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 23-3-490(B).
69. However, information regarding juveniles is still strictly prohibited from public disclosure.
Id. § 23-3-490(C).
70. Id. § 23-3-490(B). Moreover, the Sex Offender Registry fails to address the liability or
immunity of government and law enforcement officials for public disclosure of Registry information.
71. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8 (West 1995) (providing categories ofnotification pursuant
to factors relevant to risk of additional offenses).
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personnel with useful guidelines.72 New Jersey places sex offenders into three
categories according to certain risk factors.73 Depending on the risk of recidivism,
notification may be given to (1) law enforcement personnel, (2) community
organizations such as schools and religious organizations, or (3) the public, in
accordance with the New Jersey Attorney General's guidelines.74 Although this
scheme may increase the ability to identify recidivists, no statute can accurately
pinpoint potential victims of uncommitted crimes.
VI. FEDERAL SEX OFFENDER LEGISLATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
In September 1994 and by amendment in October 1996, the federal government
established guidelines for federal and state sex offender registration programs.75
These guidelines require a minimum state sex offender registry,76 create a national
sex offender database operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,77 and allow
for public dissemination and notification of registry contents in accordance with
state laws or upon a determination of necessity to protect the public.7 The federal
statutes expressly grant good faith immunity to law enforcement agencies,
employees of law enforcement agencies, and state and federal officials.79 States had
to establish a minimum sex offender registry within three years of the effective date
of the legislation."0 South Carolina's sex offender registration legislation became
effective July 1, 1994."
Three important provisions of the federal sex offender registration program are
inconsistent with, or absent from, the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry. First,
the federal guidelines require released offenders to comply with state registration
requirements for ten years.8 2 However, offenders must register for life if they have
one or more prior sex offense convictions, have been convicted of an aggravated
72. Id. The Third Circuit recently upheld the requirements for public notification for classified
sex offenders against challenges based on the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United
States Constitution. See E.B. v. Vemiero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1111 (3d Cir. 1997).
73. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8c(l)-(3) (West 1995). These factors include criminal history, the
length of the prison term served, the nature of the offense, and the relationship between the offender
and the victim. Id. § 2C:7-8b(I)-(8).
74. Id. § 2C:7-8c(l)-(3).
75. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (West 1995), amended by 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14071-14073 (West Supp.
1997).
76. Id. § 14071(a)(1).
77. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14072(b) (West Supp. 1997).
78. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(d) (West Supp. 1997).
79. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14073 (West Supp. 1997).
80. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(0(1) (West 1995) (effective Sept. 13, 1994). States had until
October 3, 1997, to comply with the national database provisions. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14072 (West Supp.
1997).
81. Act of July 1, 1994, No. 497, 1994 S.C. Acts 5129, 5794-99 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-3-400 to -490 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997)).
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(b)(6)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
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offense as defined, or have been deemed a sexually violent predator pursuant to the
federal act. 3 In contrast, the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry requires lifetime
registration for all who qualify." Second, under the federal guidelines, states must
also have a verification procedure to annually verify offenders' addresses and
information.85 South Carolina has no such procedure. Finally, the federal guidelines
exclude a perpetrator who is eighteen years of age or younger from the registration
requirements if the offense is only criminal because of the age of the victim.86 In
comparison, the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry requires registration of any
sex offender regardless of age, 7 with one narrow exception. South Carolina does
not require registration for those under sixteen years of age that are convicted of an
offense arising out of consensual sexual conduct with another person under sixteen
years of age.88
The constitutionality of sex offender registration and notification has been
challenged in only a handful of states. 9 The registration provisions have generally
withstood challenges based on due process," expost facto,9' equal protection,' and
double jeopardy.93 The most recurring problem is the retroactive application of
these statutes to individuals convicted of offenses before the statutes took effect.
The ex post facto clause forbids the imposition by law of a punishment for an act
if, when the act was committed, no such punishment existed.' However, to violate
the ex post facto clause, the law must be punitive in nature.95 To determine whether
83. Id. § 14071(b)(6)(B). A bill entitled "The Sexually Violent Predator Act" was introduced in
the South Carolina Senate in January 1998. See S. 969, 112th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (S.C. 1998)
(proposing a system ofjudicial determination and committment of sexually violent predators); see also
H.R. 3315, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997) (House version ofthe Sexually ViolentPredator
Act).
84. S.C. CODEANN. § 23-3-460 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). For a listing of qualifying offenses,
see supra note 57.
85. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(b)(3) (West 1995 & Supp. 1997).
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(a)(3)(A) (West 1995).
87. S.C. CODEANN. § 23-3-460 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
88. S.C. CODEANN. § 23-3-430(C)(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
89. See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding retroactive registration and
notification requirements), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998); E.B. v. Vemiero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d
Cir. 1997) (upholding notification under ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges, but reversing
and remanding to require that the classification and notification predetermination hearing comport with
due process), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998); Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.
1996) (upholding retroactive registration requirements); Rowev. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska
1994) (approving retroactive registration and enjoining retroactive notification); State v. Babin, 637
So. 2d 814 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding retroactive notification in violation of expostfacto clause);
Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995) (upholding both registration and notification).
90. Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1105-11; Artway, 81 F.3d at 1268-69.
91. Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1285; Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1092-1105; Artway, 81 F.3d at 1267.
92. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1267-68.
93. Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1092-1105.
94. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No bill of
attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.").
95. See Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1272-76; Artway, 81 F.3d at 1253-63.
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a law is an additional punishment and aviolation of the ex post facto clause requires
courts to consider the legislative intent and the actual effect of the law.96 Courts
have found that requiring registration is remedial, not punitive in nature, and thus
have upheld the constitutionality of these provisions.97 Only one state court has
struck down notification provisions for violating the ex post facto clause.98
VII. CONCLUSION
The threat and risk of recidivism by prior sex offenders is so serious that the
state and federal governments have acted legislatively to protect the potential
victims of sex crimes. Congress and the states have enacted sex offender registries
that maintain up-to-date information on some of society's potentially most
dangerous members. Moreover, some sovereigns have permitted public notification
of the presence of sex offenders in the community. South Carolina's provisions
differ from those enforced in other states because South Carolina allows law
enforcement personnel the discretion to disseminate sex offender information. As
a result, future challenges to this state's Sex Offender Registry and public
notification provisions may differ in form to those already played out in other
jurisdictions.
Christy E. Ford
96. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263 (synthesizing an analytical framework for ex post facto
determination).
97. See, e.g., Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1105 ("IT]he notification required by Megan's Law does not
constitute punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto [Clause].").
98. See State v. Babin, 637 So. 2d 814, 824 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
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SOUTH CAROLINA ADOPTS A HARMLESS ERROR
RuLE FOR CASES INVOLVING GOVERNMENT
INTIMIDATION OF A WITNESS
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Williams' the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed a defendant's
conviction by applying a harmless error analysis because of the government's
intimidation of a defense witness.2 The court believed that had the witness testified,
the witness's testimony might have exculpated the defendant.' In cases involving
government intimidation of witnesses different jurisdictions have employed either
a harmless error rule or a per se reversal rule.4 This Note discusses the development
and use of these two rules. In particular, the Note analyzes the Fourth Circuit case
law concerning intimidation of witnesses, because South Carolina used the Fourth
Circuit's rule as a guide in developing its rule. Finally, this Note concludes with an




In Williams the defendant appealed his murder conviction, arguing that the
State violated his due process rights by intimidating a possibly exculpatory witness.5
He was convicted of a drive-by shooting that killed one person.6 At trial, the State
argued that the fatal shot was fired from the driver's side of the van driven by
Williams.' Marion Lindsey, one of four passengers in the van, informed police that
someone outside the van fired shots simultaneously with someone inside the van.8
Because Lindsey's testimony was possibly exculpatory, Williams's attorney
contacted Lindsey's attorney to arrange an interview with Lindsey.9 Lindsey's
1. 326 S.C. 130, 485 S.E.2d 99 (1997).
2. Id. at 137,485 S.E.2d at 103.
3. Id. at 133, 485 S.E.2d at 101.
4. Craig Goldblatt, Comment, Disentangling Webb: Governmental Intimidation of Defense
Witnesses and Harmless Error Analysis, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1239, 1251 (1992).




9. Id. at 134, 485 S.E.2d at 101.
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attorney agreed to the interview, but insisted on notifying the solicitor's office.' 0
After contacting the solicitor's office, Lindsey's attorney told Williams's attorney
that "'the Solicitor's Office would not allow the interview."'' " As a result, Lindsey
refused to testify at Williams's trial fearing that he mightjeopardize his plea bargain
with the solicitor's office.' Williams alleged that the State had intimidated Lindsey
and consequently violated Williams's right to present a defense. 3 The trial court
ruled that Lindsey himself ultimately made the decision not to testify. 4 Williams
was convicted of murder and appealed. 5
The supreme court found that the trial court failed to address whether Lindsey
was improperly intimidated.' 6 Although the State admitted improper conduct, it
argued harmless error.'7 The supreme court disagreed, believing that Lindsey's
testimony would have produced information that no other witness could have
provided. 8 Holding that a defendant must prove both substantial interference and
prejudice to obtain relief for the government's intimidation of a witness,' 9 the court
found that Williams had satisfied both requirements.2" The court further opined that
"[t]he remedy to be afforded a defendant in this [type of] situation is determined by
the facts and circumstances of each case, depending on the prejudice suffered by the
defendant."'" The supreme court reversed Williams's conviction and granted him
a new trial.'
B. Per Se and Harmless Error Rules
The Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
provide an accused with the constitutional right to present a defense.3 "This right
is a fundamental element of due process of law."'24 When the accused's right to
present a defense has been violated by the government's intimidation of a defense
10. Id.
11. Williams, 326 S.C. at 134, 485 S.E.2d at 101 (quoting Lindsey's attorney).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 133, 485 S.E.2d at 101.
14. Id. at 134-35, 485 S.E.2d at 102.
15. Id. at 133, 485 S.E.2d at 101.
16. Id. at 135, 485 S.E.2d at 102.
17. Williams, 326 S.C. at 136, 485 S.E.2d at 102.
18. Id. at 136, 485 S.E.2d at 102-03.
19. Id. at 135, 485 S.E.2d at 102.
20. Id. at 136, 485 S.E.2d at 102-03.
21. Id. at 136, 485 S.E.2d at 103.
22. Id. at 137, 485 S.E.2d at 103.
23. Goldbatt, supranote4, at 1247. The Fifth Amendmentprohibits a person from being deprived
"of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Sixth
Amendment provides the accused in a criminal prosecution with the right "to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that
no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
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witness, courts have employed two rules to remedy the due process violation: a per
se reversal rule and a harmless error rule." Per se reversal requires a court to
overturn the defendant's conviction and remand the case for retrial "without regard
to prejudice to the defendants."'26 Harmless error, on the other hand, requires a
conviction to be overturned only when the outcome of the trial was influenced by
the error.27 The United States Supreme Court has not yet definitively ruled on which
standard should apply, and lower courts remain split.28 The Second, Fifth, Seventh,
and Eighth Circuits have applied a harmless error analysis to governmental
intimidation of witness cases.29 The Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits apply a per
se reversal rule." As this Note discusses, the Fourth Circuit employs a harmless
error rule if a witness testifies in spite of governmental intimidation.3'
The lower courts employing a per se reversal rule assert that the United States
Supreme Court case of Webb v. Texasi2 requires such a rule.33 In Webb the Court
reversed the defendant's conviction because the trial judge gave a "lengthy and
intimidating warning" to the defense's sole witness, after which, the witness refused
to testify.34 The Supreme Court ruled that "the unnecessarily strong terms used by
the judge could well have exerted such duress on the witness'[s] mind as to
25. Goldbatt, supra note 4, at 1251.
26. United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 703 (5th Cir. 1980).
27. Goldblatt, supra note 4, at 1239.
28. Compare, e.g., United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927,933 (2d Cir. 1988) (harmless error), with
Demps v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 1426, 1433 (11th Cir. 1986) (per se reversal).
29. Diggs v. Richards, No. 90-1720, 1992 WL 46689, at *2 (7th Cir. Mar. 13, 1992)
(unpublished opinion); Pinto, 850 F.2d at 933; United States v. Weddell, 800 F.2d 1404,1410 (5th Cir.
1986); Peeler v. Wyrick, 734 F.2d 378, 382 (8th Cir. 1984).
30. Demps, 805 F.2d at 1433; United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 228 (3d Cir. 1976);
United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334, 336 (6th Cir. 1973).
31. See United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 384 (4th Cir. 1984).
32. 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (per curiam).
33. Goldblatt, supra note 4, at 1240.
34. Webb, 409 U.S. at 97. The trial judge warned:
"Now you have been called down as a witness in this case by the Defendant. It is
the Court's duty to admonish you that you don't have to testify, that anything you
say can and will be used against you. If you take the witness stand and lie under
oath, the Court will personally see that your case goes to the grand jury and you
will be indicted for perjury and the likelihood [sic] is that you would get
convicted of perjury and that it would be stacked onto what you have already got,
so that is the matter you have got to make up your mind on. If you get on the
witness stand and lie, it is probably going to mean several years and at least more
time that you are going to have to serve. It will also be held against you in the
penitentiary when you're up for parole and the Court wants you to thoroughly
understand the chances you're taking by getting on that witness stand under oath.
You may tell the truth and if you do, that is all right, but if you lie you can get
into real trouble. The court wants you to know that. You don't owe anybody
anything to testify and it must be done freely and voluntarily and with the
thorough understanding that you know the hazard you are taking."
Id. at 95-96 (quoting the trial judge).
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preclude him from making a free and voluntary choice whether or not to testify."W5
Lower courts have read the Supreme Court's decision to overturn Webb's
conviction in spite of "apparently overwhelming evidence of guilt"36 as requiring
per se reversal when a witness has been intimidated by the government. 7
In contrast, lower courts employing a harmless error rule base their analyses on
a different line of United States Supreme Court decisions. In 1946 the Supreme
Court first articulated a harmless error rule for nonconstitutional errors in federal
criminal proceedings.38 In 1963 the Court extended the harmless error rule to
constitutional errors.39 Four years later, the Supreme Court further opined that for
a constitutional error to be harmless, it must be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.4° Many courts interpret the harmless error rule as requiring that a conviction
be upheld "when it appears from the record that the defendant is guilty."'41 In Fahy
v. Connecticut42 the Court articulated the harmless error rule by explaining that
"[w]e are not concerned here with whether there was sufficient evidence on which
the petitioner could have been convicted without the evidence complained of. The
question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained
of might have contributed to the conviction."
43
Although the Supreme Court has utilized a harmless error analysis," the Court
has yet to apply the analysis in cases involving the intimidation of a witness.
However, some lower courts have applied the harmless error rule in such a
situation. For example, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Weddell45 refused to use
a per se reversal rule to overturn defendant Hammond's conviction, choosing
instead to apply a harmless error analysis. 46 In Weddell Hammond's wife allegedly
planned to testify on her husband's behalf.47 To ensure Mrs. Hammond testified as
aprosecution witness, the government had the FBI "kidnap" Mrs. Hammond.4 As
a result, Mrs. Hammond did not testify on her husband's behalf.49 The court refused
to apply a per se reversal rule to overturn Hammond's conviction, and remanded the
case for the lower court to determine whether Mrs. Hammond would have testified
35. Id. at 98.
36. Id. at 99 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
37. Goldblatt, supra note 4, at 1240.
38. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
39. See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
40. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
41. Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due Process:
There's More to Due Process Than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1298, 1301 (1988).
42. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
43. Id. at 86-87.
44. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86-87.
45. 800 F.2d 1404 (5th Cir. 1986).
46. Id. at 1410.
47. Id. at 1409.
48. Id. The FBI "escorted" Mrs. Hammond to a motel and eventually took her to the federal
courthouse; Mrs. Hammond believed that she was in FBI custody and had to accompany the agents. Id.
49. Id. at 1411.
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for her husband had the government not interfered.5"
III. A COMPARISON OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S RULE AND THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S RULE
In State v. Williams' the South Carolina Supreme Court used the Fourth
Circuit's rule as a guide in developing its own rule governing the State's
intimidation of a defense witness.5 2 In Williams the South Carolina court noted that
"[t]he rule in the Fourth Circuit appears to be that governmental intimidation can
be deemed harmless error where the witness nonetheless testifies." 3 The South
Carolina Supreme Court cited two Fourth Circuit cases in formulating its
interpretation of the Fourth Circuit rule.54 In United States v. MaeCloskey the
defendant was charged with conspiracy to obstruct the administration ofjustice and
conspiracy to murder a federal agent.5 In a voir dire hearing prior to the trial,
defendant's witness, Edwards, provided exculpatory testimony concerning the
conspiracy charges against the defendant.56 However, because the United States
Attorney reminded Edwards that"she could be reindicted if she incriminated herself
during" the trial, Edwards decided to plead the Fifth Amendment at the trial on the
advice of counsel.5 The government conceded to the charges of improper conduct,
but argued that the error was harmless.5" The Fourth Circuit did not believe that the
error was harmless and so found "it unnecessary to determine whether the harmless
error rule applie[d] to this type of constitutional violation."59 The Fourth Circuit
granted the defendant a new trial because he "was improperly denied the complete
testimony of his major defense witness"6 even though "the evidence was sufficient
to sustain ajury finding" of MacCloskey's guilt.6"
In United States v. Teague,2 decided two years after MacCloskey, the witness
testified in spite of an "advisory" call to the witness's lawyer by the assistant United
50. Id. at 1412.
51. 326 S.C. 130, 485 S.E.2d 99 (1997).
52. Id. at 135, 485 S.E.2d at 102.
53. Id. The court implied that the inverse is true as well: governmental intimidation may not be
harmless when the witness fails to testify, and such intimidation requires an automatic reversal of the
defendant's conviction. This implication arises from the court's statement that the intimidation in
Williams "could not be deemed harmless" if the court followed the Fourth Circuit's rule because the
witness failed to testify in Williams. The court, however, rejected "such an automatic reversal rule."
Id.
54. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. MacCloskey, 682
F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1982).
55. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d at 469-70.
56. Id. at 475.
57. Id. at 475-76.
58. Id. at 479.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 475.
61. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d at 474.
62. 737 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1984).
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States attorney.63 The defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that his due
process rights were violated by the government's intimidation of his main witness.'
The Fourth Circuit refused to overturn the defendant's conviction because "Teague
was not deprived of his witness'[s] testimony and the transcript reflects that the
witness ... gave all of the favorable testimony that the defendant could have
expected., 65 Although in MacCloskey the Fourth Circuit left open the question of
harmless error analysis for the constitutional violation involved,' the court in
Teague found that the government's intimidation of the defense witness did not
result in prejudice and therefore was harmless.67
Teague illustrates the Fourth Circuit's rule that when a witness fully testifies
after governmental intimidation, the court employs a harmless error rule. The South
Carolina court in Williams was faced with the opposite situation-a witness that
failed to testify following governmental intimidation. The South Carolina Supreme
Court cited Teague and MaeCloskey and implied that the Fourth Circuit's rule
requires per se reversal when a witness fails to testify.6" The South Carolina
Supreme Court refused "to adopt such an automatic reversal rule., 69 Although the
Fourth Circuit has never decided a case on point, the Teague court's discussion of
previous case law supports this per se reversal rule.7° The Teague court stated: "In
each of the cases requiring reversal, the defendant was denied either all of the
testimony of the intimidated witness or all of the helpful testimony from the
witness."'" Distinguishing this line of precedent, the Fourth Circuit noted that the
defendant in Teague received "all of the helpful testimony" from the witness.72
Therefore, although the Fourth Circuit has yet to explicitly hold that a defendant
will be granted a new trial if a witness fails to testify following governmental
intimidation, the court's precedent leads to this conclusion.
In Williams the South Carolina Supreme Court faced the converse of the
situation in Teague. Because the witness in Williams failed to testify, the
intimidation "could not be deemed harmless" under the Teague rationale.73 As a
63. Id. at 380. The assistant U.S. attorney advised the witness's attorney that if the witness
"perjured himself he would be hearing from the United States Attorney's office and [the witness's]
pretrial diversion agreement would be revoked." Id.
64. Id. at 381.
65. Id. at 384.
66. United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 479 (4th Cir. 1982).
67. Teague, 737 F.2d at 382.
68. State v. Williams, 326 S.C.130, 135, 485 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1997).
69. Id.
70. Teague, 737 F.2d at 382-84. The Teague court discussed Webbv. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972),
MaeCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1979), United States
v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976), and UnitedStates v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1973).
71. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
72. Id.
73. State v. Williams, 326 S.C. 130, 135, 485 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1997). According to the impli-
cation of the Teague decision, Williams's conviction would be overturned because Lindsey failed to
testify. See Teague, 737 F.2d at 384.
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result, the court faced the decision whether to adopt the logical converse of the
Fourth Circuit's rule. The court refused. Instead, the court held "that in order to
obtain relief, a defendant must demonstrate both substantial interference and
prejudice." 74 Such is the language of harmless error analysis.
Comparing the Fourth Circuit's rule and the South Carolina rule established in
Williams, South Carolina's rule is less protective of the criminal defendant because
the defendant must prove "both substantial interference and prejudice. '7'  The
prejudice must be more than the witness's refusal to testify; the court will look to
see if the defendant would have been convicted even if the witness had testified.
Furthermore, even if substantial interference and prejudice are proven, the
defendant is not guaranteed a new trial. Rather, the appropriate remedy will be
determined according to "the facts and circumstances of each case. 76 With such a
case-by-case analysis, the court has offered little normative guidance for the court
of appeals.
Although South Carolina established a less protective rule, the court made the
rule easier to satisfy by clarifying what testimony would be deemed harmless. In
Williams the State argued that the intimidation of Lindsey, which resulted in his
refusal to testify, was harmless because Lindsey's testimony was "merely
cumulative to that of other witnesses. 77 To broaden the definition ofharmless error,
the court could have agreed with the government's argument that because Lindsey's
testimony was essentially the same as other witnesses' testimony, his failure to
testify was harmless. Instead, the court looked beyond the mere substance of
Lindsey's testimony. The court determined that Lindsey's failure to testify could not
be harmless because, even though he would have testified to essentially the same
facts, his credibility could have swayed the jury."
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Fourth Circuit is traditionally conservative,79 its governmental
intimidation rule is relatively liberal in that the rule provides greater protection for
the criminal defendant. In contrast, the South Carolina court has unanimously
established a more restrictive rule. By applying a harmless error rule and
74. Williams, 326 S.C. at 135, 485 S.E.2d. at 102.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 136, 485 S.E.2d at 103.
77. Id. at 136, 485 S.E.2d at 102.
78. Id. at 136, 485 S.E.2d at 102-03.
79. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1200 (D.S.C. 1974); Alicia
Christina Almeida, Note, Thomasson v. Perry: Has the Fourth Circuit Taken "Don 'tAsk, Don't Tell"
Too Literally?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 967, 1009 (1997); Ling Ling, Note, Manuel v. United States: The
Question of the Exclusionary Rule in Section 745 of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 639,
660 (1997); Stephen Mountainspring, Comment, Insurance Coverage of CERCLA Response Costs:
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simultaneously limiting what testimony can be deemed harmless, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has developed a rule that balances practicality and fairness. For this,
the supreme court should be commended. In the days of an over-burdened judicial
system, the use of a harmless error rule may be the only efficient way to deal with
governmental intimidation of witnesses. As Chief Justice Rehnquist aptly stated:
The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces
jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend
further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already
once taken place; victims may be asked to relive their disturbing
experiences. . . . These societal costs of reversal and retrial are an
acceptable and often necessary consequence when an error in the first
proceeding has deprived a defendant of a fair determination of the issue of
guilt or innocence. But the balance of interest tips decidedly the other way
when an error has had no effect on the outcome of the trial."
Rebecca Horton
80. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66,72 (1986).
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